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Eleven-year-old Mary was happily riding her bicycle on a vacant plot
of land. She did not see the irrigation ditch immediately in front of her
because it was covered with overgrown weeds and brush. Suddenly, her
wheel got caught in the ditch, and Mary was thrown off her bicycle,
sustaining serious injuries. Later that day, on the same lot, thirty-year-old
Max was scrutinizing the horizon for potential witnesses. Seeing none, he
backed his truck up onto the property near a pile of lumber, hoping to fill
the truckbed with stolen wood before getting caught. As he rushed out of
the cab, he stepped into the hidden ditch and fell, breaking his leg. Both
Mary and Max sue Lucy, the owner of the lot, to recover for injuries
caused by her negligent maintenance of the property.'
Ironically, current California law will allow Max to recover for his
injuries, but not Mary! California Civil Code section 846 provides that
landowners have no duty toward persons coming onto their property for
recreational purposes.2 Since bicycling is a recreational purpose, Lucy
owes Mary no duty whatsoever to keep her property reasonably safe.
There is, however, no comparable statute limiting Lucy's duty of care to
Max.
4
Why does the law allow such a result? Civil Code section 846 was
enacted in 1963 to encourage landowners to open their property to the
1. This hypothetical is based on the facts in Hale v. City of Santa Paula, 159 Cal. App, 3d 1233, 206
Cal. Rptr. 265 (2d Dist. 1984). hr'g granted, appeal dismissed (1985), and on the hypothetical posed by Justice
Panelli in Ornelas v. Randolph, 4 Cal. 4th 1095, 1113, 847 P.2d 560, 572, 17 Cal. Rptr. 2d 594, 606 (1993)
(Panelli, J., dissenting), which is taken from Potts v. Halsted Fin. Corp., 142 Cal. App. 3d 727, 731, 191 Cal.
Rptr. 160, 163 (2d Dist. 1983). See infra notes 272-276 and accompanying text (discussing the dissent's
hypothetical); see also infra notes 242-245 and accompanying text (discussing the majority's response to the
dissent's hypothetical); infra notes 251-255 and accompanying text (discussing the concurring opinion's response
to the dissent's hypothetical). Hale v. City of Santa Paula was superseded by grant of review and is therefore
not citable as authority in California state courts. See CAL. Cr. R. 977(a) (prohibiting the citation of depublished
opinions).
2. CAL. CIV. CODE § 846 (West Supp. 1994); see infra note 111 (setting forth the text of § 846). As
of 1991, 48 states have recreational use statutes. See infra note 116 (listing the recreational use statutes of 48
states).
3. See id. § 846 (West Supp. 1994) (providing that riding is included in the definition of recreational
purpose).
4. Cf id. § 847 (West Supp. 1994) (immunizing landowners from liability for injuries sustained by any
person during the course of an enumerated felony occurring on the property).
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public for recreational uses.' To effectuate this purpose, the California
Legislature designed a trade-off of benefits.6 The statute grants landowners
immunity from liability for injuries sustained by recreational users in order
to prevent owners of private property from closing off their land to the
public.7 In return for the opportunity to recreate on private property,
recreational users give up their right to sue for negligence.'
As the above illustration demonstrates, a pure application of section
846 can lead to unfair results. Although California law requires landowners
to maintain their property in a reasonable manner, the law specifically
exempts landowners from such a duty when the situation involves a
recreational user such as Mary. 9 A duty of care, however, applies in
Max's case, despite the fact that he is a thief."0 Although Lucy's duty to
Max does not guarantee that a court will hold her liable for his injuries, it
nonetheless gives Max the right to prove his case against Lucy. In contrast,
Mary does not even have that opportunity because of Civil Code section
846.
This Note will show that the breadth of Civil Code section 846 can
cause this type of unfairness to child plaintiffs such as Mary." For ten
years, several lower courts tried to limit section 846's grant of
immunity.' 2 Those courts held that owners of property unsuitable for
5. 1963 Cal. Stat. ch. 1759, sec. 1, at 3511 (enacting CAL. Civ. CODE § 846); Ornelas, 4 Cal. 4th at
1103-04, 847 P.2d at 565, 17 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 599; Myers v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry., 224 Cal. App.
3d 752, 758, 274 Cal. Rptr. 122, 125 (4th Dist. 1990); Wineinger v. Bear Brand Ranch, 204 Cal. App. 3d 1003,
1008-09, 251 Cal. Rptr. 681, 683-84 (4th Dist. 1988), review denied (1988); Colvin v. Southern Cal. Edison Co.,
194 Cal. App. 3d 1306, 1313, 240 Cal. Rptr. 142, 146-47 (2d Dist. 1987); Potts, 142 Cal. App. 3d at 730, 191
Cal. Rptr. at 161-62; Paige v. North Oaks Partners, 134 Cal. App. 3d 860,863, 184 Cal. Rptr. 867, 869 (2d Dist.
1982); Lostritto v. Southern Pac. Transp. Co., 73 Cal. App. 3d 737, 749, 140 Cal. Rptr. 905, 911 (1st Dist.
1977); English v. Marin Mun. Water Dist., 66 Cal. App. 3d 725, 731, 136 Cal. Rptr. 224, 228 (1st Dist. 1977),
overruled by Delta Farms Reclamation Dist. v. Superior Court, 33 Cal. 3d 699, 660 P.2d 1168, 190 Cal. Rptr.
494 (1983). cert. denied, 464 U.S. 915 (1983).
6. Ornelas, 4 Cal. 4th at 1106, 847 P.2d at 567, 17 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 601.
7. I.
8. Id.
9. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 1714 (West Supp. 1994) (providing that all persons are responsible for injuries
caused by their want of ordinary care in the management of their property); Rowland v. Christian, 69 Cal. 2d
108, 112-13,443 P.2d 561, 564,70 Cal. Rptr. 97, 100 (1968) (holding that no exception to the general duty set
forth in § 1714 will be made unless provided by statute or clearly supported by public policy); infra note 28
(setting forth pertinent parts of § 1714). But see CAL. CIV. CODE § 846 (West Supp. 1994) (providing that
landowners have no duty of care to persons on their property for recreational purposes); infra note 111 (setting
forth the text of § 846).
10. See infra notes 74-108 and accompanying text (discussing Rowland v. Christian and the current
California law on premises liability).
11. See infra notes 288-309 and accompanying text (discussing the effects of the Ornelas decision).
12. See infra notes 159-175 and accompanying text (discussing the suitability exception).
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recreational purposes could not avail themselves of the statute. 3 While
this limitation allowed child plaintiffs to recover in some instances, it
occasionally brought about unfair and anomalous results.' 4 Recently, the
California Supreme Court, in Ornelas v. Randolph,"5 abolished the
judicially created suitability exception and, in a 4-3 decision, applied
section 846 to deny an eight-year-old plaintiff the right to recover for
injuries he suffered while accompanying his friends onto a farmer's
property. 16 In doing so, the supreme court indicated that it would not
allow the judiciary to narrow section 846.17
This Note examines the possible impact of California's current
recreational use statute as a result of the California Supreme Court's
13. See Wineinger v. Bear Brand Ranch, 204 Cal. App. 3d 1003,1010,251 Cal. Rptr. 681,685 (4th Dist.
1988), review denied (1988) (holding that property under development is sufficiently withdrawn from
recreational use so as not to qualify for immunity); Domingue v. Presley of S. Cal., 197 Cal. App, 3d 1060,
1070,243 Cal. Rptr. 312,318 (2d Dist. 1988) (ruling that partially developed land is not suitable for recreational
purposes); Potts v. Halsted Fin. Corp, 142 Cal. App. 3d 727, 732, 191 Cal. Rptr. 160, 163 (2d Dist. 1983)
(concluding that the roof of a building under construction is not suitable for recreation); Paige v. North Oaks
Partners, 134 Cal. App. 3d 860, 865, 184 Cal. Rptr. 867, 870 (2d Dist. 1982) (holding that a construction site
is not within the scope of § 846); infra notes 159-175 and accompanying text (discussing the suitability
exception). But see Myers v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry., 224 Cal. App. 3d 752, 758, 274 Cal. Rptr. 122,
126 (4th Dist. 1990), review denied (1991) (holding that the shoulder of a railroad right-of-way is not per se
excluded from the application of § 846); Valladares v. Stone, 218 Cal. App. 3d 362, 369-70, 267 Cal. Rptr. 57,
61 (3d Dist. 1990) (ruling unimproved, vacant land adjacent to a residential housing development to be within
the scope of § 846); Nazar v. Rodeffer, 184 Cal. App. 3d 546, 554-55, 229 Cal. Rptr. 209, 213 (2d Dist. 1986)
(stating that the occurrence of prior accidents on unimproved, vacant land does not render the property unsuitable
for recreational purposes); Colvin v. Southern Cal. Edison Co., 194 Cal. App. 3d 1306, 1314,240 Cal. Rptr. 142,
147 (2d Dist. 1987) (concluding that space under transmission lines and around poles is suitable for recreational
use and qualifies for immunity); Lostritto v. Southern Pac. Transp. Co., 73 Cal. App. 3d 737, 750, 140 Cal. Rptr.
905, 912 (1st Dist. 1977) (applying immunity under § 846 to a railroad trestle overlooking a river without
considering whether the property was suitable for recreational purposes).
14. See Ornelas v. Randolph, 4 Cal. 4th 1095, 1107, 847 P.2d 560, 568, 17 Cal. Rptr. 2d 594, 602 (1993)
(analyzing the inconsistencies caused by the suitability exception and concluding that the exception ironically
hurt landowners who took the most effort to safeguard their property); infra notes 231-238 (discussing the
Ornelas majority's analysis of the suitability exception and its inconsistent results). For example, under the
suitability exception, Mary still would be denied recovery for her injuries because Lucy's property, a vacant lot,
would not qualify under the suitability exception. See infra notes 159-175 and accompanying text (discussing
the suitability exception).
15. 4 Cal. 4th 1095, 847 P.2d 560, 17 Cal. Rptr. 2d 594 (1993).
16. Id. at 1109, 847 P.2d at 569, 17 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 603.
17. See idL at 1108, 847 P.2d at 569, 17 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 603 (stating that the supreme court may not
thwart the legislature's plainly expressed judgment absent clear evidence of a contrary intent); id. at 1109, 847
P.2d at 569, 17 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 603 (asserting that the supreme court may question the legislature's wisdom in
extending immunity to a broad class of landowners, but may not interfere with its will); id. (George, J.,
concurring) (concluding that the language of § 846 compelled the majority's conclusion and that anomalies
resulting from the provision are the product of the statute itself); see also id. at 1105, 847 P.2d at 566-67, 17
Cal. Rptr. 2d at 600-01 (demonstrating the supreme court's reluctance to disregard the plain language of a
statute); id at 1107, 847 P.2d at 568, 17 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 602 (quoting OLIVER W. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW
127 (1881)) (commenting that the law must tend toward narrowing the field of uncertainty).
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decision in Ornelas v. Randolph. Part I discusses the background and
current status of premises liability in California, as well as the legislative
and judicial history of Civil Code section 846.18 Part II recounts the facts
of the case and summarizes the majority, concurring, and dissenting
opinions in Ornelas v. Randolph.9 Finally, Part III considers the legal
ramifications of the Ornelas decision and proposes an amendment to the
current recreational use statute to create an exception in favor of injured
children.2
I. LEGAL BACKGROUND
The California Civil Code sets forth a general rule providing that all
persons are responsible for injuries caused by their want of ordinary
care.2 1 Prior to 1969, however, California courts virtually ignored this
general principle in the area of premises liability, opting instead for the
common law approach of assigning a landowner's duty of care according
to an entrant's legal status.22 In the landmark case of Rowland v.
Christian,23 the California Supreme Court rejected the traditional system
of assigning liability and adopted a public policy balancing test for
determining whether a departure from the general duty of care was
warranted in a particular case.24 The Rowland decision, nonetheless, did
18. See infra notes 21-175 and accompanying text.
19. See infra notes 176-287 and accompanying text.
20. See infra notes 288-363 and accompanying text.
21. CAL Civ. CODE § 1714 (West Supp. 1994); see infra note 28 (setting forth pertinent parts of § 1714);
see also Rowland v. Christian, 69 Cal. 2d 108, 112, 443 P.2d 561, 564, 70 Cal. Rptr. 97, 100 (1968) (stating
that some judges and commentators regard § 1714 as the foundation of California negligence law).
22. Rowland, 69 Cal. 2d at 113, 443 P.2d at 565, 70 Cal. Rptr. at 101; see W. PAGE KEETON ET AL,
PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS §§ 58-61 (5th ed. 1984 & Supp. 1988); JOSEPH A. PAGE, THE LAW
OF PREMISES LIABILrrY §§ 2.1-4.19 (2d ed. 1988 & Supp. 1993-94) (explaining the common law approach to
assigning liability to owners and occupiers of land); see also infra notes 34-73 and accompanying text
(discussing the common law approach to premises liability cases).
23. 69 Cal. 2d 108, 443 P.2d 561, 70 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1968).
24. Rowland, 69 Cal. 2d at 112-13, 443 P.2d at 564, 70 Cal. Rptr. at 100; see infra notes 89-108 and
accompanying text (discussing the Rowland approach to premises liability cases); see also infra note 84 and
accompanying text (listing policy considerations set forth by Rowland).
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not eliminate statutory exceptions to the general duty of care. 5 One such
statutory exception exists in California Civil Code section 846.26
A. A Landowner's General Duty of Care
California law imposes a statutory duty of reasonable care upon owners
of property.27 Under California Civil Code section 1714, all persons are
responsible for their own willful acts and for injuries sustained by others
resulting from their negligent management of property.28 For years after
its enactment in 1872, section 1714 was considered a statutory principle
25. English v. Manin Mun. Water Dist., 66 Cal. App. 3d 725, 729-30, 136 Cal. Rptr. 224, 227 (1st Dist.
1977), overruled on other grounds by Delta Farms Reclamation Dist. v. Superior Court, 33 Cal. 3d 699, 660
P.2d 1168, 190 Cal. Rptr. 494, cert. denied, 464 U.S. 915 (1983).
26. English, 66 Cal. App. 3d at 730, 136 Cal. Rptr. at 227-28 (holding that § 846 is a statutory exception
to § 1714); see infra notes 136-139 and accompanying text (discussing the English case); see also CAL. CiV.
CODE § 846 (West Supp. 1994) (providing landowners with immunity from liability for injuries sustained by
persons on their property for recreational purposes); infra note 111 (setting forth the text of § 846).
27. CAL. Civ. CODE § 1714(a) (West Supp. 1994); see infra note 28 (setting forth pertinent parts of §
1714).
28. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1714(a) (West Supp. 1994). Civil Code § 1714, in pertinent part, reads as follows:
(a) Every one is responsible, not only for the result of his willful acts, but also for an injury
occasioned to another by his want of ordinary care or skill in the management of his property
or person, except so far as the latter has, willfully or by want of ordinary care, brought the
injury upon himself. The extent of liability in such cases is defined by the Title on
Compensatory Relief.
Id. The term "willful and wanton misconduct" is synonymous and interchangeable with the terms "serious and
willful misconduct," "wanton misconduct," and "reckless disregard." Morgan v. Southern Pac. Transp. Co., 37
Cal. App. 3d 1006, 1011, 112 Cal. Rptr. 695, 698 (4th Dist. 1974). These terms describe an intentional act of
an unreasonable character done in disregard of a known or obvious risk which is so great that it is highly
probable that harm will follow. Id. (quoting Wn.LuAM L. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS § 34, at 185 (4th ed. 1971));
see Morgan, 37 Cal. App. 3d at 1012, 112 Cal. Rptr. at 698 (requiring a negligent act to contain three elements
before it rises to the level of willful misconduct: (1) Actual or constructive knowledge of the danger; (2) actual
or constructive knowledge that an injury might result from the danger, and (3) conscious failure to act to avoid
the danger); Palazzi v. Air Cargo Terminals, Inc., 244 Cal. App. 2d 190, 195, 52 Cal. Rptr. 817, 820 (4th Dist.
1966) (defining willful misconduct as intentional wrongful conduct which the actor knows will result in serious
injury, or that is done with a wanton and reckless disregard for the probable consequences); Goldman v. House,
93 Cal. App. 2d 572, 576, 209 P.2d 639, 641 (Ist Dist. 1949) (stating that it is immaterial that the actor did not
intend the particular consequences of a willful act); Lennon v. Woodbury, 3 Cal. App. 2d 595,597,40 P.2d 292,
293 (4th Dist. 1935) (explaining that negligence is carelessness and is usually negative in character, while willful
misconduct is of a positive nature involving the performance of a wrongful act with the intent to harm another
and with utter disregard for the results); see also Ahem v. Dillenback, 1 Cal. App. 4th 36, 42, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d
339, 341 (4th Dist. 1991) (setting forth the elements of negligence as follows: (1) Legal duty to use due care;
(2) breach of that duty; (3) reasonably close causal connection between that breach and the resulting injury; and
(4) actual loss or damage); Barbaria v. Independent Elevator Co., 139 Cal. App. 2d 474, 482, 293 P.2d 855, 860
(Ist Dist. 1956) (defining negligence as conduct falling below the law's standard for the protection of other
persons against unreasonable risks of harm); MeMahon v. Marshall, 111 Cal. App. 2d 248, 252, 244 P.2d 481,
483 (2d Dist. 1952) (explaining that negligence is a relative term, which depends on the surrounding
circumstances, and is to be viewed in light of what a reasonable person would have done in the particular
situation).
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which did not affect the common law of negligence.29 The common law
thus continued to assign liability to landowners for injuries sustained by
persons on the owner's property according to the individual's legal
status.30 A person who entered onto another's property was categorized
as either a trespasser, licensee, or invitee.31 The common law then
imposed a particular standard of care on the landowner according to the
entrant's status.32 As society progressed, however, the classifications
became harder to distinguish and apply, and thus often led to arbitrary
results.33
1. The Common Law Approach: Invitees, Licensees, Trespassers,
and Attractive Nuisances
Under the traditional common law, the purpose for which a person
entered onto another's property determined whether the person was
considered an invitee, licensee, or trespasser.34 An entrant was classified
as an invitee if the person fit the description of either a public invitee or
a business visitor.35 A public invitee was defined as a member of the
public invited onto private property to use the premises in accordance with
the owner's intentions, even if the person did not pay to enter the
29. Rowland v. Christian, 69 Cal. 2d 108, 112, 443 P.2d 561, 564, 70 Cal. Rptr. 97, 100 (1968).
30. Id at 113,443 P.2d at 565, 70 Cal. Rptr. at 101; see KEETON ET AL, supra note 22, §§ 58-61; PAGE,
supra note 22, §§ 2.1-4.19 (explaining the common law approach to assigning liability to owners and occupiers
of land); infra notes 34-73 and accompanying text (discussing the common law approach).
31. See KEETON Er AL, supra note 22, §§ 58-61; PAGE, supra note 22, §§ 2.1-4.19 (explaining the
common law approach to assigning liability to owners and occupiers of land); infra notes 34-73 and
accompanying text (discussing the common law approach and the definitions of each category). The
classification of entrants was based on feudal traditions. Rowland, 69 Cal. 2d at 113,443 P.2d at 564-65,70 Cal.
Rptr. at 100-01; PAGE, supra note 22, § 2.1.
32. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 22, §§ 58-61; PAGE, supra note 22, §§ 2.1-4.19 (explaining the
common law approach to assigning liability to owners and occupiers of land); infra notes 34-73 and
accompanying text (discussing the common law approach and the definitions of each category).
33. Rowland, 69 Cal. 2d at 116, 443 P.2d at 566-67, 70 Cal. Rptr. at 102-03; see Fernandez v.
Consolidated Fisheries, Inc., 98 Cal. App. 2d 91,96,219 P.2d 73,76-77 (1st Dist. 1950) (criticizing the common
law approach as unrealistic, arbitrary, and inelastic, and advocating an approach based on Civil Code § 1714
in premises liability cases); see also KEETON Er AL., supra note 22, § 62; PAGE, supra note 22, § 6.1 (discussing
the criticisms of the common law approach).
34. Popejoy v. Hannon, 37 Cal. 2d 159, 169, 231 P.2d 484, 490 (1951); see KEETON ET AL, supra note
22, §§ 58-61; PAGE, supra note 22, §§ 2.1-4.19 (explaining the common law approach to assigning liability to
owners and occupiers of land).
35. O'Keefe v. South End Rowing Club, 64 Cal. 2d 729, 737, 414 P.2d 830, 835, 51 Cal. Rptr. 534, 539
(1966) (quoting RESTATEmENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 332(1) (1965)); see O'Keefe, 64 Cal. 2d at 739,414 P.2d
at 836, 51 Cal. Rptr. at 540 (adopting the Restatement's definition of invitee as California law). See generally
KEETON ET AL., supra note 22, § 61; PAGE, supra note 22, §§ 4.2-4.3 (discussing the definition of an invitee).
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premises.36 A business visitor was defined as a person invited onto an
owner's property for a purpose connected with the owner's business.37
What distinguished the invitee from other common law classifications
was that the landowner in some way induced or lured the person onto the
property.38 The invitation did not have to be express, but could be
implied from the surrounding circumstances. 39 An implied invitation
could be limited, however, by the circumstances surrounding the invitation,
the character of the area to which the person was invited, and the
conditions under which the owner made the invitation.40 As long as the
owner's business received some benefit from the entrant, the person was
36. O'Keefe, 64 Cal. 2d at 737, 414 P.2d at 835, 51 Cal. Rptr. at 539 (quoting RESTATEiENT (SECOND)
OF TORTS § 332(2) (1965)); see id. at 739, 414 P.2d at 836, 51 Cal. Rptr. at 540 (adopting the Restatement's
definition of invitee as California law); see also, e.g., Farrier v. Levin, 176 Cal. App. 2d 791, 803, 1 Cal. Rptr.
742, 750 (2d Dist. 1959) (ruling that a person accompanying a customer into defendant's store was a public
invitee); Basye v. Craft's Golden State Shows, 43 Cal. App. 2d 782, 788-89, 111 P.2d 746, 750-51 (3d Dist.
1941) (holding that the operator of a shooting gallery had a duty to protect patrons, even if they were spectators).
But see O'Keefe, 64 Cal. 2d at 739, 414 P.2d at 836, 51 Cal. Rptr. at 540 (concluding that children trespassing
on the property of a private rowing club were not public invitees).
37. O'Keefe, 64 Cal. 2d at 737, 414 P.2d at 835, 51 Cal. Rptr. at 539 (quoting RESTATEM, ENT (SECOND)
OF TORTS § 332(3) (1965)); see id. at 739, 414 P.2d at 836, 51 Cal. Rptr. at 540 (adopting the Restatement's
definition of invitee as California law); see also, e.g., Oettinger v. Stewart, 24 Cal. 2d 133, 136, 148 P.2d 19,
21 (1944) (holding that a prospective tenant visiting an apartment building was a business visitor).
38. O'Keefe, 64 Cal. 2d at 739, 414 P.2d at 836, 51 Cal. Rptr. at 540 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORTS § 332 cmt. c (1965)); see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 332 cmt. c (1965) (explaining that
the landowner must exhibit conduct indicating that the premises are intended for public entry, and that it is
immaterial that the visitor is not required to pay admission or that the landowner is not opening the land for a
business purpose); see also infra notes 67-71 and accompanying text (discussing the possibility of changing
one's common law classification while still on the premises).
39. See Oettinger, 24 Cal. 2d at 136, 148 P.2d at 21 (stating that an invitation may be express or implied
from the possessor's conduct, the arrangement of the premises, or local customs); Polk v. Laurel Hill Cemetery
Ass'n, 37 Cal. App. 624, 631-32, 174 P. 414,416-17 (3d Dist. 1918) (stating that when the conduct of an owner
of land leads another to believe that the land is to be used in a certain way and acquiesces to such use by the
other person, the owner has made an implied invitation); see also, e.g., Hayes v. Richfield Oil Corp., 38 Cal.
2d 375, 381, 240 P.2d 580, 583 (1952) (concluding that a service station's offer to allow patrons to park their
vehicles overnight on its premises constituted an implied invitation to the patrons to enter the property to access
their vehicles); Bush v. Weed Lumber Co., 55 Cal. App. 588, 591, 204 P. 24, 25 (3d Dist. 1921) (stating that
a reward offer for finding something on the premises constituted an implied invitation to offerees to enter the
property for the purpose of finding the item). But see Giannini v. Campodonico, 176 Cal. 548, 551, 169 P. 80,
81 (1917), distinguished on other grounds, Oettinger v. Stewart, 24 Cal. 2d 133, 148 P.2d 19 (1944) (concluding
that a bystander who was paid for performing services at the unauthorized request of an employee is not an
invitee of the employer).
40. Bush, 55 Cal. App. at 591,204 P. at 25; see Polk, 37 Cal. App. at 631, 174 P. at 416 (holding that
an implied invitation to a cemetery was not an invitation to use it as a playground); see also infra notes 67-71
and accompanying text (discussing the possibility of changing one's common law classification while still on
the premises).
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considered an invitee." Accordingly, customers and prospective
customers,4 2 service providers,43 employees or customers of tenants,'
and even persons waiting to meet passengers at railroad depots have all
been considered invitees.45
Landowners had a duty to warn invitees of known defects on the
premises and to inspect and correct potential defects.46 The reason for
imposing such a standard of care on landowners was that invitees did not
act for their own convenience or pleasure, but rather were using the
premises according to the owner's intention or design. 47 For this reason,
invitees were owed the highest duty of care under the common law.48
The common law classified persons as licensees if they entered the
premises of another with permission and for their own purpose and
41. See Speece v. Browne, 229 Cal. App. 2d 487,492,40 Cal. Rptr. 384, 387-88 (1st Dist. 1964) (stating
that in order for a person to be considered an invitee, the owner must receive a benefit from the person's
presence, a benefit more than the intangible benefit of having social visitors); Smith v. Kern County Land Co.,
51 Cal. 2d 205, 208, 331 P.2d 645, 647 (1958) (declaring that a visitor is an invitee when the purpose of the
visit is not for the visitor's own pleasure, but one of common interest and mutual advantage to the parties); see
also, e.g., Tierstein v. Licht, 174 Cal. App. 2d 835, 840, 345 P.2d 341, 344 (2d Dist. 1959) (holding that when
a veterinarian was on the property to treat a horse and later assisted in loading another horse onto a trailer, the
veterinarian was an invitee as to the trailer); Fernquist v. San Francisco Presbytery, 152 Cal. App. 2d 405, 409,
313 P.2d 192, 194 (Ist Dist. 1957) (categorizing a church member who volunteered carpentry services to the
church as an invitee); Edwards v. Hollywood Canteen, 27 Cal. 2d 802, 808-09, 167 P.2d 729, 732-33 (1946)
(concluding that although the plaintiff was on the premises for a social affair, since the nature of the owner's
business was to provide social activities, the plaintiff was an invitee because the owner derived a benefit from
the plaintiff's duties as a voluntary host).
42. See Chance v. Lawry's, Inc., 58 Cal. 2d 368, 373, 374 P.2d 185, 188, 24 Cal. Rptr. 209,211
(1962) (concluding that a restaurant customer is an invitee); Farrier v. Levin, 176 Cal. App. 2d 791, 803, 1
Cal. Rptr. 742, 750 (2d Dist. 1959) (ruling that a person accompanying a customer into defendant's store is
a public invitee).
43. See Stockovich v. Acme Spray Painters, 129 Cal. App. 2d 81, 84, 276 P.2d 1, 3 (2d Dist. 1954)
(concluding that a bridge inspector is an invitee); Tharp v. San Joaquin Cotton Oil Co., 27 Cal. App. 2d 554,
557, 81 P.2d 443, 444 (3d Dist. 1938) (categorizing a deliveryman as an invitee).
44. See DeGraf v. Anglo Cal. Nat'l Bank, 14 Cal. 2d 87, 93, 92 P.2d 899, 902 (1939) (holding that
an employee of a building tenant is an invitee); Brown v. Pepperdine, 53 Cal. App. 334, 336, 200 P. 36, 37
(1st Dist. 1921) (determining that a tenant's customer is an invitee when injured in a common area of a
building).
45. See Kircher v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry., 32 Cal. 2d 176, 186, 195 P.2d 427, 434 (1948)
(classifying a person waiting at a railroad depot as an invitee).
46. Chance, 58 Cal. 2d at 373,374 P.2d at 187,24 Cal. Rptr. at 211; REsTATnmENT (SECOND) OFTORTS
§ 341 (1965). See generally KEErN ET AL., supra note 22, § 61; PAGE, supra note 22, §§ 4.5-4.12 (discussing
the requisite duty of care toward invitees).
47. O'Keefe v. South End Rowing Club, 64 Cal. 2d 729,738,414 P.2d 830, 836,51 Cal. Rptr. 534,540
(1966) (citing Barker v. Southern Pac. Co., 118 Cal. App. 748, 751, 5 P.2d 970, 971-72 (1931)).
48. Beauchamp v. Los Gatos Golf Course, 273 Cal. App. 2d 20, 26, 77 Cal. Rptr. 914, 918 (1st Dist.
1969).
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benefit.49 A licensee's status did not change even if the entrant's activities
on the premises were of an incidental economic benefit to the owner. 0
Social guests are the most typical example of licensees.5,
Landowners were permitted to exercise a lower standard of care toward
licensees than was required for invitees.52 With regard to a licensee, a
landowner merely had to refrain from causing wanton or willful injury and
was not liable for injuries resulting from conditions on the land, unless the
condition constituted a trap. 3 The lower standard of care was justified on
the theory that a guest should not expect a host to specially inspect the
property solely on his or her account. 4
An entrant was classified as a trespasser under the common law if the
person entered the premises of another without permission.5 A landowner
merely had a duty to refrain from causing willful or wanton injury to
49. Laidlaw v. Perozzi, 130 Cal. App. 2d 169, 171, 278 P.2d 523, 524 (3d Dist. 1955); see id. (stating
that a licensee's presence is not invited, but is merely tolerated); infra notes 67-71 and accompanying text
(discussing the possibility of changing one's common law classification while still on the premises); see also
Kneiser v. Belasco-Blackwood Co., 22 Cal. App. 205, 206, 133 P. 989, 989-90 (2d Dist. 1913) (holding that
a person entering a business for the sole purpose of using the restroom is a licensee). But see Lehman v.
Richfield Oil Corp., 121 Cal. App. 2d 261, 264, 263 P.2d 13, 15 (2d Dist. 1953) (holding that a person whose
sole purpose for entering a service station was to use a pay telephone, which the station maintained for profit,
was an invitee). See generally KEETON ET AL, supra note 22, § 60; PAGE, supra note 22, §§ 3.1-3.6 (discussing
the definition of licensee).
50. See Bylling v. Edwards, 193 Cal. App. 2d 736, 742, 14 Cal. Rptr. 760, 764 (2d Dist. 1961) (stating
that even though a guest performed catering-type services, such as helping the host to clear the table and taking
refreshments to other guests, the guest was nonetheless on the premises for social purposes, and was still a
licensee). But see Speece v. Browne, 229 Cal. App. 2d 487,494,40 Cal. Rptr. 384, 389 (1st Dist. 1964) (stating
that if the character of the visitor's services become the dominant aspect of the guest-host relationship, for
example, when a guest cooks dinner for the host, the visitor is an invitee); infra notes 67-71 and accompanying
text (discussing the possibility of changing one's common law classification while still on the premises). But
cf Edwards v. Hollywood Canteen, 27 Cal. 2d. 802, 808-09, 167 P.2d 729,732-33 (1946) (holding that although
the plaintiff was on the premises for a social affair, since the nature of the owner's business was to provide
social activities, the plaintiff was an invitee because the owner derived a benefit from the plaintiff's duties as
a voluntary host).
51. Fitch v. LeBeau, 1 Cal. App. 3d 320, 324, 81 Cal. Rptr. 722, 725 (4th Dist. 1969); KuEToN Err AL.,
supra note 22, § 60, at 414.
52. See Laidlaw, 130 Cal. App. 2d at 171,278 P.2d at 524 (stating that a landowner must accord a higher
degree of care to an invitee than to a licensee).
53. Bylling, 193 Cal. App. 2d at 742, 14 Cal. Rptr. at 764 (citing Oettinger v. Stewart, 24 Cal. 2d 133,
138, 148 P.2d 19, 22 (1944)); see RESTATEMENT (SE COND) OF TORTs § 342 (1965) (providing that landowners
are liable for injuries caused to licensees if they fail to warn of dangerous conditions on the property which a
licensee is not expected to discover); see also Palmquist v. Mercer, 43 Cal. 2d 92, 102, 272 P.2d 26, 32 (1954)
(stating that licensees must accept the premises as they find them). See generally KEETON ET AL., supra note
22, § 60; PAGE, supra note 22, §§ 3.7-3.14 (discussing the requisite duty of care toward licensees).
54. Rowland v. Christian, 69 Cal. 2d 108, 114, 443 P.2d 561, 565, 70 Cal. Rptr. 97, 101 (1968).
55. Oettinger v. Stewart, 24 Cal. 2d 133, 136, 148 P.2d 19, 20 (1944) (citing RESTATEMENT OF TORTS
§ 329 (1934)); see Kirkpatrick v. Damianakes, 15 Cal. App. 2d 446, 449, 59 P.2d 556, 557 (1st Dist. 1936)
(holding that a person who mistakenly drove a car into a private alley is a trespasser). See generally KEETON
ET AL., supra note 22, § 58; PAGE, supra note 22, § 2.2 (discussing the definition of trespasser).
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trespassers. 6 Because trespassers entered property without permission,
they assumed the risk of what they encountered and had to look out for
themselves.5 7 If the landowner knew or should have known of a
trespasser's presence, however, or knew that people habitually trespassed
on the property, the duty to refrain from causing willful or wanton injury
became a duty to warn of concealed dangers caused by artificial
conditions.5 8
Trespassing children presented a unique problem for which the
common law created a separate rule known as the attractive nuisance
doctrine. 9 Under the attractive nuisance doctrine, a landowner was
subject to liability for injuries suffered by trespassing children caused by
an artificial condition which the landowner knew or should have known
children would encounter.60 The rationale behind the doctrine was that
56. Giannini v. Campodonico, 176 Cal. 548,550, 169 P. 80, 81 (1917); see Hume v. Hart, 109 Cal. App.
2d 614, 615-16, 241 P.2d 25, 26 (3d Dist. 1952) (ruling that a trespasser could not recover for personal injuries
when she walked across private property at 2 a.m. and fell into an unlighted, unguarded grease pit); Flick v.
Ducey & Attwood Rock Co., 70 Cal. App. 2d 70, 78, 160 P.2d 569, 573 (2d Dist. 1945) (holding that plaintiff
was a trespasser when he mistakenly drove onto a private road and, therefore, could not recover for personal
injuries when his car fell into a gravel pit); supra note 28 (defining willful and wanton conduct). See generally
KEETON Er AL., supra note 22, § 58; PAGE, supra note 22, § 2.3, (discussing the requisite duty of care toward
trespassers).
57. Hume, 109 Cal. App. 2d at 615, 241 P.2d at 26.
58. Boucher v. American Bridge Co., 95 Cal. App. 2d 659, 668, 213 P.2d 537, 544 (1st Dist. 1950);
REsTATEmENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 334-36 (1965); see Blaylock v. Jensen, 44 Cal. App. 2d 850, 852, 113
P.2d 256, 257 (2d Dist. 1941) (holding that a landowner was liable for injuries sustained by a person who
stepped into an oil sump which was covered with dirt because the oil sump constituted a trap). See generally
KEETON Er AL., supra note 22, § 58; PAGE, supra note 22, §§ 2.4-2.6 (discussing the requisite duty of care
toward known trespassers).
59. See Marino v. Valenti, 118 Cal. App. 2d 830, 842, 259 P.2d 84, 90 (1st Dist. 1953) (stating that
because of the immaturity of children, the law created an exception to the rule governing trespassers);
RFsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTs § 339 (1965) (regarding artificial conditions highly dangerous to trespassing
children); infra note 60 (setting forth the Restatement's version of the attractive nuisance doctrine). See generally
KEEN ET AL, supra note 22, § 59 (discussing the common law regarding trespassing children); PAGE, supra
note 22, §§ 2.8-2.13 (discussing the current law regarding trespassing children); Peter Karsten, Explaining the
Fight Over the Attractive Nuisance Doctrine: A Kinder, Gentler Instrumentalism in the "Age of Formalism, "
10 LAw & HIST. REv. 45 (1992) (tracing the development of the attractive nuisance doctrine from the English
common law to its adoption into American jurisprudence); William L. Prosser, Trespassing Children, 47 CAL.
L. REV. 427 (1959) (explaining the reasons for the attractive nuisance doctrine and discussing each element of
the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 339); Osborne M. Reynolds, Jr., Attractive Nuisance: More Nuisance Than
Attraction, 26 OKLA. L. REv. 342 (1973) (commenting that the attractive nuisance doctrine is nothing more than
a reasonableness test); David A. Gurwin, Comment, The Restatement's Attractive Nuisance Doctrine: An
Attractive Alternative for Ohio, 46 OHio ST. LJ. 135 (1985) (providing a general overview of the attractive
nuisance doctrine and assessing its strengths and weaknesses).
60. Reynolds v. Willson, 51 Cal. 2d 94, 100, 331 P.2d 48, 51-52 (1958); see Marino, 118 Cal. App. 2d
at 842, 259 P.2d at 90 (stating that the children's trespass must be foreseeable, the condition of the premises
must involve an unreasonable risk of harm to children, and that the burden of correcting the condition must be
slight in comparison to its usefulness and the magnitude of the risk). The Restatement (Second) of Torts provides
the following rule regarding artificial conditions highly dangerous to trespassing children:
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even though a child was a trespasser, a child did not possess the judgment
and maturity to understand the dangers of trespassing.6 Landowners
therefore owed a greater duty of care to trespassing children than to adult
trespassers. 62
A possessor of land is subject to liability for physical harm to children trespassing thereon caused
by an artificial condition upon the land if
(a) the place where the condition exists is one upon which the possessor knows or has reason to
know that children are likely to trespass, and
(b) the condition is one of which the possessor knows or has reason to know and which he realizes
or should realize will involve an unreasonable risk of death or serious bodily harm to such
children, and
(c) the children because of their youth do not discover the condition or realize the risk involved
in intermeddling with it or in coming within the area made dangerous by it, and
(d) the utility to the possessor of maintaining the condition and the burden of eliminating the
danger are slight as compared with the risk to children involved, and
- (e) the possessor fails to exercise reasonable care to eliminate the danger or otherwise to protect
the children.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) oizTORTs § 339 (1965). The Restatement (Second) of Torts rejected the judicial fiction
of "allurement" which was part of the original common law attractive nuisance doctrine, and opted instead for
a foreseeability standard. Gurwin, supra note 59, at 138-40. Under the attractive nuisance doctrine, trespassing
children had the burden of proving that they did not appreciate the danger when entering the property (i.e., did
not assume the risk) and that it was feasible for the landowner to eliminate the dangerous condition. Beard v.
Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe Ry., 4 Cal. App. 3d 129, 136, 84 Cal. Rptr. 449,454 (2d Dist. 1970), superseded
by statute on other grounds, 1971 Cal. Stats. ch. 1554, sec. 1, at 3067 (enacting CAL CIV. CODE § 1714.7).
61. Copfer v. Golden, 135 Cal. App. 2d 623, 627-29, 288 P.2d 90, 93 (2d Dist. 1955); KEErON Er AL.,
supra note 22, § 59, at 399-400, 408-09. Dean Prosser asserts that adult trespassers are wrongdoers who have
no right to demand a safe place to trespass, especially since they can protect themselves from ordinary dangers
and make conscious decisions to assume the risks that they encounter. Prosser, supra note 59, at 427-28. He also
argues that it is desirable social policy to allow landowners to use their property as they please, and that they
should not have the burden to protect those who enter their land without permission. Id. at 428. Trespassing
children, however, do not have the same level of maturity and judgment as adults, and therefore warrant a
greater degree of protection under the law. Id. at 429. See also Karsten, supra note 59, at 70-79 (discussing three
different rationales for the attractive nuisance doctrine: the "nature of children" explanation, the "judicial aid to
industrialization" explanation, and the "cost-benefit analysis" explanation). But see Reynolds, supra note 59, at
347 (arguing that the attractive nuisance doctrine is nothing more than an ordinary negligence standard with a
recognition of the habits and characteristics of very young children).
62. McDaniel v. Sunset Manor Co., 220 Cal. App. 3d 1, 7, 269 Cal. Rptr. 196, 199 (1st Dist. 1990)
(stating that a greater degree of care is generally owed children because of their lack of capacity to appreciate
and avoid danger). The attractive nuisance doctrine developed from cases involving children who had injured
themselves on railroad turntables. Sioux City & Pac. R.R. v. Stout, 84 U.S. 657, 660 (1873); see Callahan v.
Eel River & E.R. Co., 92 Cal. 89, 92, 28 P. 104, 104 (1891); Barrett v. Southern Pac. Co., 91 Cal. 296, 302,
27 P. 666, 667 (1891) (applying the rule in Stout to a California turntable case). See generally PAGE, supra note
22, § 2.9 (discussing the turntable cases); Karsten, supra note 59 (tracing the development of the attractive
nuisance doctrine from the English common law to its adoption into American jurisprudence); Prosser, supra
note 59, at 430-32 (discussing the history of the attractive nuisance doctrine); Gurwin, supra note 59, at 136-38
(providing a history of the attractive nuisance doctrine). The attractive nuisance doctrine only applied to artificial
conditions on property, such as abandoned shacks, abandoned dynamite caps, a dump cart in an old mine, and
electric power line poles with ground level foot spikes which would permit children to climb on the pole. See
Marino, 118 Cal. App. 2d at 850, 259 P.2d at 95 (applying the attractive nuisance doctrine to abandoned
shacks); Lambert v. Western Pac. Ry., 135 Cal. App. 81, 85, 26 P.2d 824, 824 (3d Dist. 1933) (involving
abandoned dynamite caps); Clark v. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., 118 Cal. App. 344, 348, 5 P.2d 58, 60 (3d Dist.
1931) (involving spiked electrical poles); Faylor v. Great E. Quicksilver Mining Co., 45 Cal. App. 194,204, 187
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Under the attractive nuisance doctrine, landowners had a duty to use
reasonable care to prevent conditions from which children would not be
able to protect themselves.63 The imposition of this duty did not elevate
the common law status of trespassing children to that of a licensee or
invitee, but was simply a recognition that trespassing children were a
special class warranting a higher standard of care. 4 If the child was
already an invitee, the doctrine would not be invoked.65 Moreover, where
an attractive nuisance was not involved, the owner owed the same duty to
trespassing children as to trespassing adults.
66
Finally, the common law provided that an entrant's status as an invitee,
licensee, or trespasser could change when the individual's subsequent
conduct placed the person into a different category.67 For example, if an
invitee exceeded the scope of the landowner's invitation by entering areas
of the property to which the person was not invited, the invitee might be
considered a trespasser or licensee as to that area.68 In contrast, if a
person entered a business establishment as a licensee, but became a
customer while still on the property, the person's status would change to
that of an invitee.69 Likewise, when a licensee performed services
substantially benefitting the landowner so that the character of the services
became the dominant aspect of their relationship, the licensee's status
would elevate to that of an invitee.7" When a person's status thus changed
P. 101, 105 (1st Dist. 1919) (involving a dump cart in an old mine).
63. Garcia v. Soogian, 52 Cal. 2d 107, 110, 338 P.2d 433, 434-35 (1959).
64. Morse v. Douglas, 107 Cal. App. 196, 201, 290 P. 465, 467 (4th Dist. 1930). Opponents of the
attractive nuisance doctrine, however, give the following reasons for rejecting it: (1) The doctrine is based on
sympathy rather than on sound principles of law; (2) the doctrine impairs property rights; (3) the doctrine
imposes on members of the public a greater duty to protect children than on the children's parents; and (4) the
doctrine is tantamount to providing insurance for all children. Gurwin, supra note 59, at 147-48. See Prosser,
supra note 59, at 432-35 (tracing the historical opposition to the doctrine); Reynolds, supra note 59, at 346
(discussing the different criticisms of the doctrine). One commentator noted that supporters of the doctrine
described children as "bees and butterflies" who wandered everywhere, following their hearts' desires, while
opposers would describe children as annoying, venturesome, and intermeddling truants. Karsten, supra note 59,
at 70-71.
65. Kataoka v. May Dep't Stores Co., 60 Cal. App. 2d 177, 185, 140 P.2d 467, 472 (2d Dist. 1943).
66. Wilson v. Long Beach, 71 Cal. App. 2d 235, 241, 162 P.2d 658, 661 (2d Dist. 1945).
67. PAGE, supra note 22, § 3.5.
68. Boucher v. American Bridge Co., 95 Cal. App. 2d 659, 670, 213 P.2d 537, 544-45 (1st Dist. 1950);
see Medcraft v. Merchants' Exchange, 21,1 Cal. 404,406, 295 P. 822, 824 (1931) (holding that the plaintiff was
a licensee when he fell into an air shaft while looking for a washroom); Davis v. Silverwood, 116 Cal. App. 2d
39, 41, 253 P.2d 83, 84 (2d Dist. 1953) (holding that the plaintiff, who had left the owner's premises after
completing a business errand and had later voluntarily returned to assist the owner's employee, was a licensee
on his second visit).
69. Braun v. Vallade, 33 Cal. App. 279, 282, 164 P. 904, 905 (1st Dist. 1917).
70. Speece v. Browne, 229 Cal. App. 2d 487,494,40 Cal. Rptr. 384,389 (1st Dist. 1964); see id (stating
that the determination of whether the services became a dominant aspect of the relationship is a question of fact).
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while on the property, the landowner's standard of care toward that person
changed accordingly.
71
Classifying entrants as either invitees, licensees, or trespassers proved
difficult and often brought confusion and uncertainty in defining exactly
when a person fit into a certain category.72 Because of these difficulties,
the California Supreme Court abolished the common law system of
classifying entrants according to their status and adopted a public policy
balancing test to determine whether landowners owed a duty to a person
on their property.73
2. Rowland v. Christian: Restoring the General Duty of Care and
Abolishing the Common Law Categorizations
The California Supreme Court, in Rowland v. Christian,74 eliminated
the trespasser-licensee-invitee distinction from California tort law.75 The
decision also effectively abolished the attractive nuisance doctrine.76
71. Powell v. Jones, 133 Cal. App. 2d 601, 607, 284 P.2d 856, 860 (2d Dist. 1955).
72. Rowland v. Christian, 69 Cal. 2d 108, 116, 443 P.2d 561, 566, 70 Cal. Rptr. 97, 102 (1968); see
Fernandez v. Consolidated Fisheries, Inc., 98 Cal. App. 2d 91, 96, 219 P.2d 73, 76-77 (1st Dist. 1950)
(criticizing the common law approach as unrealistic, arbitrary, and inelastic, and advocating an approach based
on Civil Code § 1714 in premises liability cases); see also KEEroN ET AL., supra note 22, § 62 (discussing
criticisms of the common law status distinctions and providing a history of their abolishment); PAGE, supra note
22, § 6.1 (explaining the dissatisfaction with the common law approach).
73. Rowland, 69 Cal. 2d at 112-13, 443 P.2d at 564, 70 Cal. Rptr. at 100; see infra notes 74-108
(discussing the Rowland decision and the Rowland approach to premises liability cases).
74. 69 Cal. 2d 108, 443 P.2d 561, 70 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1968).
75. IL at 119, 443 P.2d at 568, 70 Cal. Rptr. at 104. See generally, KEETON Er AL., supra note 22, § 62
(presenting the development of the law in different jurisdictions after the repudiation of common law categories);
PAGE, supra note 22, §§ 6.1-6.9 (discussing the impact of the abolition of status categories); Carl S. Hawkins,
Premises Liability After Repudiation of the Status Categories: Allocation of Judge and Jury Functions, 1981
UTAH L. REV. 15 (analyzing whether the procedural differences resulting from the repudiation of status
categories caused any differences in case outcome); Jon J. Shindurling, The Law of Premises Liability - Is a
Reasonable Standard of Care Unreasonable?, 13 IDAHO L. REv. 67 (1976) (analyzing how the elimination of
the common law approach has affected the premises liability cases in several states and advocating the Rowland
approach); Stephen R. Brooks, Note, Torts - Invitees, Licensees and Trespassers - A Trend Towards
Abolishing Classification of Entrants, 76 W. VA. L. REv. 202 (1974) (tracing the trend to abolish status
categories in other states following Rowland); Richard P. Lasko, Comment, Duty of Reasonable Care to Third
Persons on the Premises, 26 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 128 (1969); Gary T. Sham, Note, Califomia Applies
Negligence Principles in Determining Liability of a Land Occupier, 9 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 179 (1968)
(discussing how Rowland changed California premises liability law); Tonu Toomepuu, Note, Torts-Trespassers
and Licensees-Elimination of Common Lav Classifications, 49 B.U. L. REV. 198 (1969) (evaluating the,
Rowland decision).
76. See Smith v. Americania Motor Lodge, 39 Cal. App. 3d 1, 7, 113 Cal. Rptr. 771, 774 (lst Dist,
1974); Beard v. Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe Ry., 4 Cal. App. 3d 129, 136, 84 Cal. Rptr. 449, 454 (2d Dist.
1970), superseded by statute on other grounds, 1971 Cal. Stats. ch. 1554, sec. 1, at 3067 (enacting CAL. CIV.
CODE § 1714.7) (concluding Rowland effectively abolished the attractive nuisance doctrine); infra notes 96-105
and accompanying text (discussing how Rowland abolished the attractive nuisance doctrine).
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Abrogating the common law approach, the Rowland court adopted instead
a public policy balancing test to determine whether an exception to the
general duty set forth in California Civil Code section 1714 was warranted
in a particular case.7
In Rowland, the plaintiff was a guest in the defendant's apartment
when he injured himself turning a faulty faucet handle in the defendant's
bathroom. 78 The trial court, following the rule that a social guest is a
licensee, granted summary judgment for the defendant. 79 The supreme
court, however, reversed the trial court's decision.80
The supreme court began its analysis by reciting the general principle
embodied in Civil Code section 1714, which states that everyone is
responsible for his own willful acts and is liable for injuries caused by the
negligent management of his property or person.8 Stating that this
principle is the foundation of California negligence law, the supreme court
ruled that unless a statutory exception to section 1714 is found, no
departure from this principle can be made unless clearly supported by
public policy. 82 The Rowland court explained that when dealing with
premises liability issues, the judiciary had departed from the statute's
general principle.8 3 The supreme court then enumerated a number of
policy considerations which must be balanced when determining whether
an exception to section 1714 should be made in a particular case.Y
The Rowland court then commented on the difficulties of the common
law approach. The supreme court first explained that an increasing regard
77. Rowland 69 Cal. 2d at 112-13,443 P.2d at 564,70 Cal. Rptr. at 100; see supra note 28 (setting forth
the pertinent parts of California Civil Code § 1714).
78. Rowland, 69 Cal. 2d at 110, 443 P.2d at 562, 70 Cal. Rptr. at 98. It was not clear from the record
whether the faucet handle was an obvious or concealed dangerous condition. Id.
79. ld
80. 1&. at 120, 443 P.2d at 569, 70 Cal. Rptr. at 105.
81. Id. at 111-12, 443 P.2d at 563-64, 70 Cal. Rptr. at 99-100; CAL Crv. CODE § 1714 (West Supp.
1994); see supra note 28 (setting forth the pertinent parts of § 1714).
82. Rowland, 69 Cal. 2d at 112, 443 P.2d at 564,70 Cal. Rptr. at 100.
83. Id. at 113, 443 P.2d at 564, 70 Cal. Rptr. at 100; see CAL. Ov. CODE § 1714 (West Supp. 1994)
(providing that persons are responsible for injuries caused by the negligent management of property); supra note
28 (setting forth pertinent parts of § 1714). The supreme court attributed this special departure to the high regard
for land in English and American traditions. Rowland, 69 Cal. 2d at 113, 443 P.2d at 564, 70 Cal. Rptr. at 100;
PAGE, supra note 22, § 2.1.
84. Rowland, 69 Cal. 2d at 113,443 P.2d at 564, 70 Cal. Rptr. at 100. The Rowland public policy factors
are: (1) The foreseeability of the harm to the plaintiff; (2) the degree of certainty that the plaintiff suffered
injury; (3) the closeness of the connection between the injury and the defendant's conduct; (4) the moral blame
attached to the defendant's conduct; (5) the policy of preventing future harm; (6) the extent of the burden to the
defendant and consequences to the community of imposing a duty in a particular case; and (7) the prevalence
and availability of insurance. Id.
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for human safety had led judges to interpret situations broadly to permit
recovery for personal injuries." The definitions of invitee, licensee, and
trespasser in turn became confusing and complex. 6 Finding that the basis
of the common law status classifications was feudal tradition, which no
longer applied in an urban, industrialized society, the Rowland court
commented that the protection of a person's life or limb should not be
determined by how the person came upon another's land. 7 Accordingly,
the California Supreme Court abolished the common law classifications
and replaced them with a duty of reasonable care in all situations, from
which courts could only depart if the balance of certain public policy
considerations justified such a departure. 8
Although Rowland was a significant change from the traditional
common law approach to premises liability, the reasonableness standard
imposed by Rowland virtually left the landowner's duty to invitees
unaffected.89 Under Rowland, landowners still have a duty to warn
invitees of known defects on the premises and to inspect and correct
potential hazards. 9 The general duty of care required by Civil Code
section 1714 is thus generally consonant with the traditional common law
duty owed to invitees." With respect to licensees and trespassers,
however, the effect of Rowland was much different.
Under the common law, landowners had a duty to refrain from willful
and wanton injury of both licensees and trespassers, and in the case of
85. Id. at 114, 443 P.2d at 565, 70 Cal. Rptr. at 101. The Rowland court found an example in Hansen
v. Richey, 237 Cal. App. 2d 475,481, 46 Cal. Rptr. 909,913 (3d Dist. 1965), involving a wrongful death action
for children who drowned. Rowland, 69 Cal. 2d at 114,443 P.2d at 565,70 Cal. Rptr. at 101. The Hansen court,
rather than finding negligence in the maintenance of the swimming pool, instead found the defendant actively
negligent because he conducted a party for children with knowledge of the presence of a dangerous pool. Id.
86. Rowland, 69 Cal. 2d at 117, 443 P.2d at 567, 70 Cal. Rptr. at 103; see supra note 72 (providing
further criticisms of the common law approach).
87. Rowland, 69 Cal. 2d at 118,443 P.2d at 568,70 Cal. Rptr. at 104; see id. at 113,443 P.2d at 564-65,
70 Cal. Rptr. at 100-01 (discussing the feudal traditions behind the common law distinctions); id. at 117, 443
P.2d at 567,70 Cal. Rptr. at 103 (stating that the common law justifications for the status distinctions no longer
apply in modem society).
88. Id. at 112-13, 443 P.2d at 564, 70 Cal. Rptr. at 100.
89. See Williams v. Carl Karcher Enters., Inc., 182 Cal. App. 3d 479, 487, 227 Cal. Rptr., 465, 469 (4th
Dist. 1986) (stating that Rowland has had the least effect on the duty owed to invitees); Beauchamp v. Los Gatos
Golf Course, 273 Cal. App. 2d 20, 27,77 Cal. Rptr. 914, 919 (1st Dist. 1969) (concluding that Rowland did not
abrogate the substantive duties of landowners to invitees).
90. See Rowland, 69 Cal. 2d at 119, 443 P.2d at 568, 70 Cal. Rptr. at 104 (holding that the proper test
to be applied in premises liability cases is to determine whether the landowners acted reasonably in the
management of their property, without regard to the entrant's status); cf. REsTATEmENT (SECOND) Op TORTS §§
341-341A (1965) (setting forth the duty toward invitees under the common law); supra notes 38-48 and
accompanying text (discussing the definition of an invitee and the duty of landowners toward invitees).
91. Beauchamp, 273 Cal. App. 2d at 26-27, 77 Cal. Rptr. at 919.
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licensees, an additional duty to warn of known dangers on the premises.92
Now, instead of automatically categorizing an entrant before applying the
corresponding common law rules, Rowland requires the court to determine
whether the landowner acted reasonably in managing the property with
respect to the entrant.93 For example, applying the test to the facts in
Rowland, a jury would determine whether the defendant should have
warned the plaintiff, a common law licensee, of the broken faucet in order
to fulfill the duty of reasonable care.94 Furthermore, in a situation
involving a common law trespasser who climbed up a lamppost and was
electrocuted while unscrewing a lightbulb, a jury would determine whether
the defendant electric company should have taken safety precautions to
prevent such occurrences, especially in light of evidence that the company
knew of such occurrences in the past.95
Finally, the Rowland decision effectively eliminated the attractive
nuisance doctrine because trespassing children and adults are given the
same judicial treatment.96 Since the status of an entrant was no longer
relevant to determine a landowner's duty of care, exceptions to the
common law rules lost their purpose.97 Therefore, as an exception to a
landowner's duty to trespassers, the attractive nuisance doctrine was
effectively abolished by Rowland.98
Despite Rowland's elimination of the attractive nuisance doctrine,
trespassing children are not completely disadvantaged in premises liability
92. See supra notes 49-58 and accompanying text (discussing the definitions and traditional duties oved
licensees and trespassers).
93. Rowland, 69 Cal. 2d at 119, 443 P.2d at 568, 70 Cal. Rptr. at 104; see Fitch v. LeBeau, 1 Cal. App.
3d 320, 324, 81 Cal. Rptr. 722, 725 (4th Dist. 1969); Carlson v. Ross, 271 Cal. App. 2d 29, 32, 76 Cal. Rptr.
209, 211 (3d Dist. 1969) (applying the Rowland approach to premises liability cases involving licensees); see
also Mark v. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., 7 Cal. 3d 170, 177,496 P.2d 1276, 1280, 101 Cal. Rptr. 908,912 (1972);
Cappa v. Oscar C. Holmes, Inc., 25 Cal. App. 3d 978, 983, 102 Cal. Rptr. 207, 210 (1st Dist. 1972); Beard v.
Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe Ry., 4 Cal. App. 3d 129, 136, 84 Cal. Rptr. 449,454 (2d Dist. 1970), superseded
by statute on other grounds, 1971 Cal. Stats. ch. 1554, sec. 1, at 3067 (enacting CAL. CIV. CODE § 1714.7)
(applying the Rowland approach to premises liability cases involving trespassers).
94. Sham, supra note 75, at 185.
95. Mark, 7 Cal. 3d at 178, 496 P.2d at 1281, 101 Cal. Rptr. at 913.
96. Smith v. Americania Motor Lodge, 39 Cal. App. 3d 1, 7, 113 Cal. Rptr. 771, 774 (Ist Dist. 1974);
Beard, 4 Cal. App. 3d at 135-36, 84 Cal. Rptr. at 454 (concluding that Rowland abolished the attractive nuisance
doctrine); see supra notes 59-66 and accompanying text (discussing the common law attractive nuisance
doctrine).
97. Beard, 4 Cal. App. 3d at 136, 84 Cal. Rptr. at 454.
98. Id,
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cases. 99 In Beard v. Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe Railway Co.,"' the
court pointed out that the burden of proof had shifted from the child
plaintiff to the defendant landowner. 01 Under the attractive nuisance
doctrine, trespassing children had the burden of proving their lack of
appreciation for the dangers that existed on the defendant's property.'0
Trespassing children also had to prove that it was feasible for the
landowner to eliminate the danger. 0 3 Under Rowland, however, a
person's status as a trespasser no longer creates a rebuttable presumption
that the entrant assumed the risk of injury.'04 Defendant's now have the
burden of establishing that a trespassing child assumed the risk.0 5
Although Rowland abolished the common law exceptions to a
landowner's duty of care, it did not eliminate statutory exceptions to Civil
Code section 1714.'06 The supreme court ruled that an exception to the
general principle embodied in section 1714 could only be accomplished by
statute or by finding a clear public policy justification.0 7 By enacting
Civil Code section 846, the California legislature created one such
statutory exception to encourage private landowners to open their lands to
the public for recreational use.0 8
99. See Gurwin, supra note 59, at 137 n.20 (commenting that while the Rowland approach provides
children with protection from dangerous conditions on land, its effects will go farther than the Restatement's
attractive nuisance doctrine because adults are afforded the same protection as children); Sham, supra note 75,
at 187 (remarking that Rowland merely reaffirms the basis of the attractive nuisance doctrine; that children lack
the judgment and maturity to appreciate certain types of dangers).
100. 4 Cal. App. 3d 129, 84 Cal. Rptr. 449 (2d Dist. 1970), superseded by statute, 1971 Cal. Stats. ch.
1554, sec. 1, at 3067 (enacting CAL. Cir. CODE § 1714.7).
101. Beard, 4 Cal. App. 3d at 136-37, 84 Cal. Rptr. at 454.
102. Id. at 136, 84 Cal. Rptr. at 454. Child plaintiffs had the burden to rebut the presumption that they
had assumed the risks as trespassers. Il See Prosser, supra note 59, at 427-29 (commenting that trespassers are
wrongdoers who have no right to demand that premises be safe for them to trespass, but because children lack
the maturity and judgment of adults, they cannot be expected to have assumed all the risks of trespassing).
103. Beard, 4 Cal. App. 3d at 136, 84 Cal. Rptr. at 454.
104. Id. at 136-37, 84 Cal. Rptr. at 454.
105. Id, at 137, 84 Cal. Rptr. at 454.
106. English v. Main Mun. Dist., 66 Cal. App. 3d 725, 729-30, 136 Cal. Rptr. 224, 227-28 (1st Dist,
1977), overruled on other grounds by Delta Farms Reclamation Dist. v. Superior Court, 33 Cal. 3d 699, 660
P.2d 1168, 190 Cal. Rptr. 494, cert. denied, 464 U.S. 915 (1983); Rowland v. Christian, 69 Cal. 2d 108, 112,
443 P.2d 561, 564, 70 Cal. Rptr. 97, 100 (1968).
107. Rowland, 69 Cal. 2d at 112, 443 P.2d at 564, 70 Cal. Rptr. at 100.
108. See CAL, Civ. CODE § 846 (West Supp. 1994) (providing that landowners are immune from liability
for injuries sustained by persons on the property for recreational purposes); infra note 111 (setting forth the text
of § 846); infra notes 124-126 and accompanying text (discussing the purpose of § 846).
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B. California's Recreational Use Statute
While California law imposes a statutory duty of reasonable care on
everyone, it also provides exceptions from that duty.1 9 One of the
recognized exceptions to California Civil Code section 1714, is Civil Code
section 846.110 The current version of section 846 provides that owners
of possessory or nonpossessory interests in real property owe no duty of
care to keep the premises safe for persons coming onto their land for any
recreational purpose.' Under the statute, landowners owe no duty to
109. CAL CIV. CODE § 1714 (West Supp. 1994); see supra note 28 (setting forth pertinent parts of §
1714). Other exceptions to the general duty of care include California Civil Code §§ 846, 846.2, 847, 1714.2,
1714.25, 1714.45, 1714.5, 1714.7. See id. § 846 (West Supp. 1994) (granting to landowners immunity from
liability for injuries sustained by persons on the property for recreational uses); id § 846.2 (West Supp. 1994)
(exempting owners, tenants, or lessees of land from liability for injuries to persons expressly invited onto the
land to glean food for charitable purposes); id. § 847 (West Supp. 1994) (exempting owners of possessory or
nonpossessory interests in property from liability for injuries sustained by persons during the course of a
commission of an enumerated felony); id § 1714.2 (West 1985) (exempting persons certified to perform
cardiopulmonary resuscitation from liability for injuries sustained as a result of their rendering emergency aid);
idi § 1714.25 (West Supp. 1994) (exempting food facilities that donate food to charities from liability for injuries
caused by the consumption of the donated food, unless the food was prepared negligently); id. § 1714.45 (West
Supp. 1994) (limiting the liability of product manufacturers for injuries resulting from the use of certain
products); id. § 1714.5 (West 1985) (exempting owners and operators of emergency defense shelters from
injuries resulting from conditions on their premises); iUL § 1714.7 (West 1985) (exempting owners and operators
of railroads from liability for injuries sustained by persons getting onto moving locomotives without permission).
110. See English. 66 Cal. App. 3d at 730, 136 Cal. Rptr. at 228 (stating that the many amendments made
to § 846 after the Rowland v. Christian decision indicate that the legislature intended for § 846 to be an
exception to § 1714).
111. CAL. Civ. CODE § 846 (West Supp. 1994); see infra notes 141-153 and accompanying text
(discussing possessory and nonpossessory interests covered by § 846). The statute in full reads:
An owner of any estate or any other interest in real property, whether possessory or
nonpossessory, owes no duty of care to keep the premises safe for entry or use by others for any
recreational purpose or to give any warning of hazardous conditions, uses of, structures, or activities
on such premises to persons entering for such purpose, except as provided in this section.
A "recreational purpose," as used in this section, includes such activities as fishing, hunting,
camping, water sports, hiking, spelunking, sport parachuting, riding, including animal riding,
snowiobiling, and all other types of vehicular riding, rock collecting, sightseeing, picnicking, nature
study, nature contacting, recreational gardening, gleaning, hang gliding, winter sports, and viewing
or enjoying historical, archaeological, scenic, natural, or scientific sites.
An owner of any estate or any other interest in real property, whether possessory or
nonpossessory, who gives permission to another for entry or use for the above purpose upon the
premises does not thereby (a) extend any assurance that the premises are safe for such purpose, or
(b) constitute the person to whom permission has been granted the legal status of an invitee or
licensee to whom a duty of care is owed, or (c) assume responsibility for or incur liability for any
injury to person or property caused by any act of such person to whom permission has been granted
except as provided in this section.
This section does not limit the liability which otherwise exists (a) for willful or malicious failure
to guard or warn against a dangerous condition, use, structure or activity; or (b) for injury suffered
in any case where permission to enter for the above purpose was granted for a consideration other
than the consideration, if any, paid to said landowner by the state, or where consideration has been
received from others for the same purpose; or (c) to any persons who are expressly invited rather than
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warn recreational entrants of hazardous conditions, uses, structures, or
activities."' The provision defines a recreational purpose to include
certain enumerated activities.
1 3
Section 846 expressly provides that owners who permit recreational
users to enter their properties do not assure the entrants that the premises
are safe, do not grant the entrants the legal status of invitees or licensees,
and do not assume responsibility for their injuries." 4  The statute,
however, does not extend immunity to landowners if they willfully or
maliciously failed to warn of a dangerous condition, if they granted
permission to enter their land for consideration, or if they expressly invited
the persons onto their property."1 5 Currently, forty-eight states have
comparable recreational use statutes. t 16 A brief history of section 846 is
merely permitted to come upon the premises by the landowner.
Nothing in this section creates a duty of care or ground of liability for injury to person or property.
CAL. CIV. CODE § 846 (West Supp. 1994); see infra note 116 (listing comparable recreational use statutes from
other jurisdictions). For other analyses of California Civil Code § 846, see 50 CAL. JUR. Premises Liability §§
32-37 (1993) (discussing California Civil Code § 846); 6 B.E. WrrKiN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW, Torts
§§ 912-917 (9th ed. 1988 & Supp. 1993) (discussing California Civil Code § 846); Gretchen Brambach,
Comment, Tort Liability of Agricultural Landowners to Recreational Entrants: A Critical Analysis, 11 U.C.
DAVIS L. REv. 367 (1978) (criticizing California Civil Code § 846 as unfair and unnecessary, advocating instead
the use of the Rowland approach to govern recreational use situations); Christine C. Weiner, Comment, Should
Landowners Have Tort Immunity From Recreational Users?, 16 W. ST. U. L. REV. 201 (1988) (analyzing the
elements of California Civil Code § 846 and how they have been judicially construed). See generally KEE'ON
Er AL., supra note 22, § 60 (discussing recreational use statutes); PACE, supra note 22, §§ 5.13-5.23 (discussing
recreational use statutes); John C. Barrett, Good Sports and Bad Lands: The Application of Washington's
Recreational Use Statute Limiting Landowner Liability, 53 WASH. L. REV. 1 (1977) (discussing Washington's
recreational use statute); Jim Butler, Outdoor Sports and Torts: An Analysis of Utah's Recreational Use Act,
1988 UTAH L. REV. 47 (1988) (analyzing Utah's recreational use statute and comparing it with those used in
other states); Donald P. Judges, Of Rocks and Hard Places: The Value of Risk Choice, 42 EMORY LJ. 1, 93-99
(1993) (discussing recreational use statutes); Helge Wulff, Recreational Access to Agricultural Land: The
European Experience, 24 IND. L. REV. 1641 (1991) (describing the European right of public access to lands on
the countryside); Stuart J. Ford, Comment, Wisconsin's Recreational Use Statute: Towards Sharpening the
Picture at the Edges, 1991 Wis. L. REv. 491 (1991) (comparing the recreational use statutes of different states);
Robin Cheryl Miller, Annotation, Effect of Statute Limiting Landowner's Liability for Personal Injury to
Recreational User, 47 A.L.R. 4th 262 (1986 & Supp. 1993) (comparing the recreational use statutes and their
applications in different states).
112. CAL CIV. CODE § 846 (West Supp. 1994); see supra note Il l (setting forth the text of § 846).
113. CAL ClV. CODE § 846 (West Supp. 1994); see supra note Il l (setting forth the text of § 846).
114. CAL CIv. CODE § 846 (West Supp. 1994); see supra note 111 (setting forth the text of § 846).
115. CAL CIv. CODE § 846 (West Supp. 1994); see Consolidated Rock Prods. Co. v. Williams, 171 Cal.
App. 3d 686, 691, 217 Cal. Rptr. 522, 527 (1985) (defining malice for the purpose of California Civil Code §
846 as conduct intended to cause injury or which is performed with a conscious disregard for the safety of
others); supra note 28 (defining willful); Weiner, supra note 111, at 224-33 (discussing the interpretation of the
willful and malicious element); see also id. at 221-23 (discussing the judicial interpretation of the consideration
element of § 846); id. at 223-24 (discussing the interpretation of an express invitation).
116. ALA. CODE §§ 35-15-20 to -28 (1975); ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 33-1551 (Supp. 1993); ARK. CODE
ANN. §§ 18-11-301 to -307 (Michie 1987 & Supp. 1993); CAL. CIV. CODE § 846 (West Supp. 1994); COLO.
REV. STAT. § 33-41-104(1)(c) (1984); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 52-557f to -557k (Vest 1991); DEL. CODE
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helpful to understand the California Supreme Court's reasoning behind
Ornelas v. Randolph.117
1. The Legislative History of Civil Code Section 846
As originally enacted in 1963, section 846 declared that an owner of
real property owed no duty of care to persons entering onto the property
for the taking of fish and game, camping, water sports, sightseeing, and
hiking."' The 1963 version of section 846 also provided that if the
owner gave permission to a person to be on the property for those
activities, the owner did not assure the entrant that the property was safe,
did not grant the entrant the status of invitee or licensee, and did not
assume liability for any injuries the entrant suffered.119 The statute,
however, did not extend immunity to persons expressly invited by the
owner.12 It also did not confer immunity to a landowner for the willful
ANN. tit. 7 §§ 5901-5907 (1991); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 375.251 (West 1988); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 51-3-20 to -26
(1982); HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 520-1 to -8 (1985); IDAHO CODE § 36-1604 (Supp. 1993); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch.
745 para. 65/1 to/7 (Smith-Hurd 1993); IND. CODE ANN. § 14-2-6-3 (West Supp. 1993); IOWA CODE ANN. §§
461C.1-.7 (West Supp. 1993); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 58-3201 to -3207 (1983 & Supp. 1993); KY. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 150.645 (Baldwin 1991); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 9:2791, 9:2795 (West 1991); ME. REV. STAT. ANN.
tit. 14, § 159-A (West 1990 & Supp. 1993); MD. CODE ANN., NAT. RES. §§ 5-1101 to -1108 (1989); MASS.
GEN. L. ANN. ch. 21, § 17C (West Supp. 1993); MiCH. COMI'. LAWS. ANN. § 300.201 (West Supp. 1993);
MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 87.01-.03 (West 1977 & Supp. 1994); Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 89-2-1 to -7 (1991); Mo.
ANN. STAT. §§ 537.345-.349 (Vernon 1988 & Supp. 1993); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 70-16-301 to -302 (1992);
NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 37-1001 to -1008 (1988); NEV. REV. STAT. § 41.510 (Michie 1986 & Supp. 1993); N.H.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 212:34 (1989); NJ. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A:42A-2 to -8 (West 1987 & Supp. 1993); N.M. STAT.
ANN. § 17-4-7 (Michie 1988); N.Y. GEN. OBUG. LAW § 23A 9-103 (McKinney 1989); N.D. CENT. CODE §§
53-08-01 to -06 (1989 & Supp. 1993); OHIo REV. CODE ANN. §§ 1533.18-.181 (Anderson 1986); OKLa. STAT.
ANN. tit. 76, §§ I0 to 15.1 (West 1987 & Supp. 1994); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 105.655-.680 (1990 & Supp. 1992);
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 68, §§ 477-1 to -8 (Purdon 1979); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 32-6-1 to -7 (1982 & Supp. 1993);
S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 27-3-10 to -70 (Law. Co-op. 1991); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 20-9-18 (1987); TENN.
CODE ANN. §§ 70-7-101 to -105 (1987 & Supp. 1993); TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 75.001-.003
(Vest 1986 & Supp. 1994); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 57-14-1 to -7 (1990); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 10 § 5212 (1993);
VA. CODE ANN. § 29.1-509 (Michie 1992); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 4.24.210 (West Supp. 1994); W. VA.
CODE §§ 19-25-1 to -5 (1993); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 895.52 (West Supp. 1993); Wyo. STAT. §§ 34-19-101 to -
106 (1990); see Barrett, supra note 111, at 2-3 (attributing most recreational use statutes to the model
recreational use act drafted by the Council of State Governments in 1965); see also COUNCIL OF STATE
GOVERNMENTS, SUGGESTED STATE LEGISLATION, VOL XXIV, at 150-52 (1965) (providing the model
recreational use statute). See generally Butler, supra note 111 (analyzing the differences between the recreational
use statutes of different states); Miller, supra note 111 (comparing the recreational use statutes and their
applications in different states).
117. 4 Cal. 4th 1095, 847 P.2d 560, 17 Cal. Rptr. 594 (1993).
118. 1963 Cal. Stat. ch. 1759, sec. 1, at 3511 (enacting CIV. CODE § 846). See generally Comment,
Selected 1963 Legislation, 38 CAL. ST. B. J. 647 (1963) [hereinafter Selected 1963 Legislation].
119. 1963 Cal. Stat. ch. 1759, sec. 1, at 3511 (enacting CAL. CIV. CODE § 846).
120. Id But see Selected 1963 Legislation, supra note 118 (stating that as originally drafted, § 846 would
have also exempted landowners from liability to persons expressly invited onto the premises).
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or malicious' failure to guard or warn against dangerous conditions, or
to situations where the owner was paid consideration for a specified use
of the property, unless the consideration was paid by the state. 22 Civil
Code section 846 has been amended eight times since its enactment.
2 3
The purpose of creating this exception to a landowner's general duty
was to encourage owners to open their lands to the public for recreational
purposes.12 ' By limiting a landowner's liability, owners would be less
likely to close off their property to recreational users for fear of lawsuits,
and the public would gain increased opportunities for recreation.'
2 5
Section 846 thus provided a trade-off: the public would gain greater
recreational opportunities in exchange for less protection by the state's tort
laws, and landowners would gain immunity from liability in exchange for
keeping their properties open to the public.
26
The first six amendments to Civil Code section 846 involved additions
or changes to the original list of recreational activities giving rise to
121. See Consolidated Rock Prods. Co. v. Williams, 171 Cal. App. 3d 686, 691,217 Cal. Rptr. 522, 527
(1985) (defining malice for the purpose of California Civil Code § 846 as conduct intended to cause injury or
which is performed with a conscious disregard for the safety of others); Selected 1963 Legislation, supra note
118 (suggesting that a landowner who does not warn of known, concealed dangers to foreseeable entrants may
be considered to be acting wilfully); supra note 28 (defining willful).
122. 1963 Cal. Stat. ch. 1759, sec. 1, at 3511 (enacting CIv. CODE § 846).
123. See 1988 Cal. Stat. ch. 129, sec. 1, at 507 (amending CAL. CIV. CODE § 846); 1980 Cal. Stat. ch. 408,
sec. 1, at 797 (amending CAL. Civ. CODE § 846); 1979 Cal. Stat. ch. 150, sec. 1, at 347 (amending CAL. CIV.
CODE § 846); 1978 Cal. Stat. ch. 86, sec. 1, at 221 (amending CAL CIV. CODE § 846); 1976 Cal. Stat. ch. 1303,
sec. 1, at 5858 (amending CAL. Civ. CODE § 846); 1972 Cal. Stat. ch. 1200, sec. I., at 2322 (amending CAL.
Civ. CODE § 846); 1971 Cal. Stat. ch. 1028, sec. 1, at 1975 (amending CAL. CIV. CODE § 846); 1970 Cal. Stat.
ch. 807, sec. 1, at 1530 (amending CAL CIV. CODE § 846); 1963 Cal. Stat. ch. 1759, sec. 1, at 3511 (enacting
CAL Civ. CODE § 846).
124. Omelas v. Randolph, 4 Cal. 4th 1095, 1103-04, 847 P.2d 560,565, 17 Cal. Rptr. 2d 594,599 (1993);
Myers v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry., 224 Cal. App. 3d 752, 758, 274 Cal. Rptr. 122, 125 (4h Dist.
1990), review denied (1991); Wineinger v. Bear Brand Ranch, 204 Cal. App. 3d 1003, 1008-09, 251 Cal. Rptr.
681,683-84 (4th Dist. 1988), review denied (1988); Colvin v. Southern Cal. Edison Co., 194 Cal. App. 3d 1306,
1313, 240 Cal. Rptr. 142, 146-47 (2d Dist. 1987); Potts v. Halsted Fin. Corp, 142 Cal. App. 3d 727, 730, 191
Cal. Rptr. 160, 162 (2d Dist. 1983); Paige v. North Oaks Partners, 134 Cal. App. 3d 860, 863, 184 Cal. Rptr.
867, 869 (2d Dist. 1982); Lostritto v. Southern Pac. Transp. Co., 73 Cal. App. 3d, 737, 749, 140 Cal. Rptr. 905,
911 (1st Dist. 1977); English v. Matin Mun. Water Dist., 66 Cal. App. 3d 725, 731, 136 Cal. Rptr. 224, 228
(1st Dist. 1977), overruled on other grounds by Delta Farms Reclamation Dist. v. Superior Court, 33 Cal. 3d
699, 660 P.2d 1168, 190 Cal. Rptr. 494 (1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 915 (1983); see also Barrett, supra note
111, at 3 (explaining that the purpose of limiting landowner liability under the common law is to encourage them
to make their property available to the public); Ford, supra note 111, at 491 (stating that recreational use statutes
are intended to promote public recreational use of private property). See generally PAGE, supra note 22, § 5.14
(discussing the purpose of recreational use statutes); Weiner, supra note 111, at 204-05 (analyzing the legislative
intent behind § 846). But see Brambach, supra note 111, at 375-76 (arguing that the judicially interpreted
purpose is inaccurate because § 846 allows landowners to avail themselves of immunity regardless of whether
they actually opened their land for public recreational use).
125. English, 66 Cal. App. 3d at 731, 136 Cal. Rptr. at 228.
126. Ornelas, 4 Cal. 4th at 1106, 847 P.2d at 567, 17 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 601.
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immunity from liability. 27 In 1980, the legislature amended section 846
in response to two decisions of the Court of Appeal for the Third District
of California which held that owners of nonpossessory interests were not
immune from liability under the statute. 128  The 1980 amendment
extended immunity from liability to owners of any estate or any other
interest, both possessory and nonpossessory.12 9 Finally, the latest
amendment to the statute added hang gliding to the list of recreational
activities in 1988.130 Over the last three decades, as the legislature
continued to amend section 846, the judiciary was called upon to interpret
these provisions. How courts came to construe section 846 played a big
role in how the statute was later applied.
127. See 1970 Cal. Stat. ch. 807, see. 1, at 1530 (amending CAL. CIv. CODE § 846 to include riding to
the list of activities); 1971 Cal. Stat. ch. 1028, sec. 1, at 1975 (amending CAL. CIV. CODE § 846 to include rock
collecting); 1972 Cal. Stat. ch. 1200, sec. 1, at 2322 (amending CAL. CIV. CODE § 846 by changing the phrase
"for the taking of fish and game" to "hunting [and] fishing"); 1976 Cal. Stat. ch. 1303, sec. I, at 5858 (amending
CAL. CIV. CODE § 846 to include spelunking and all forms of animal and vehicular riding). See generally
ASsEMBLY ANALYSIS OF SB 1469, at 1 (Aug. 24, 1976) (stating that the purpose of the 1976 amendment,
sponsored by the Western Region of the National Speleological Society, was to increase protection afforded to
caves); Review of Selected 1971 California Legislation: Torts; landowner's liability, 4 PAC. I.J. 211,667 (1972)
(analyzing the 1971 amendment to § 846); Review of Selected 1970 California Legislation: Landowner Liability
for Injury to Recreational Users of Unimproved Lands, 2 PAC. LU. 275, 465-66 (1971) (analyzing the 1970
amendment to § 846). In 1978, the statute was amended to immunize landowners from liability for injuries
sustained by persons on the property for "any recreational purpose." 1978 Cal. Stat. ch. 86, sec. I, at 221
(amending CAL CIV. CODE § 846). The legislature defined "recreational purpose" to include the existing
enumerated activities and added the following endeavors to that list: snowmobiling, picnicking, nature study,
nature contacting, recreational gardening, gleaning, winter sports, and viewing historical, archaeological, scenic,
natural, or scientific sites. Id The following year, sport parachuting was added to the statutory list as well. 1979
Cal. Stat. ch. 150, sec. 1, at 347 (amending CAL. CIv. CODE § 846).
128. 1980 Cal. Stat. ch. 408, sec. 1, at 797 (amending CAL CIV. CODE § 846); Ornelas, 4 Cal. 4th at
1102-03, 847 P.2d at 565, 17 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 599; see O'Shea v. Claude C. Wood Co., 97 Cal. App. 3d 903,
911, 159 Cal. Rptr. 125, 129-30 (3d Dist. 1979), superseded by statute, 1980 Cal. Stat. ch. 408, sec. 1, at 797
(amending CAL ClV. CODE § 846) (holding that a license is not a possessory interest and thus not eligible for
immunity from liability under § 846); Darr v. Lone Star Indus., Inc., 94 Cal. App. 3d 895, 901, 157 Cal. Rptr.
90, 94 (3d Dist. 1979), superseded by statute, 1980 Cal. Stat. ch. 408, sec. 1, at 797 (amending CAL. Crv. CODE
§ 846) (holding that an easement is not a possessory interest and thus not eligible for immunity from liability
under § 846); infra notes 141-153 and accompanying text (discussing the Darr and O'Shea cases); see also
RESTATEmENT OF PROPERTY § 7 (1936) (defining possessory interests in land); id. § 8 (defining real property);
id § 9 (defining estate); id. § 10 (defining owner). But see Smith v. Scrap Disposal Corp., 96 Cal. App. 3d 523,
529, 158 Cal. Rptr. 134, 137 (4th Dist. 1979) (holding that because the defendant had the duty to maintain
control over the easement and the right to bar ingress, the purpose of § 846 was fulfilled, and the defendant was
entitled to immunity). See generally Review of Selected 1980 California Legislation: Torts; premises liability
- recreational purposes immunity, 12 PAC. UJ. 235, 599 (1981) [hereinafter Review of Selected 1980 California
Legislation] (analyzing the 1980 amendment to § 846).
129. 1980 Cal. Stat. ch. 408, sec. 1, at 797 (amending CAL Civ. CODE § 846).
130. 1988 Cal. Stat. ch. 129, sec. 1, at 507 (amending CAL CIv. CODE § 846). See gqnerally Review of
Selected 1988 California Legislation: Torts; premises liability- limited immunity for personal injury to persons
on land, 20 PAC. LJ. 423,733-34 (1989) [hereinafter Review of Selected 1988 California Legislation] (analyzing
the 1988 amendment).
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2. The Judicial Treatment of Civil Code Section 846
California Civil Code section 846 has had a dynamic judicial
history.131 In some cases, lower court interpretations of the statute have
led to reversals by the California Supreme Court and to immediate
legislative amendments. 32 When one court held that section 846 applied
only to possessory interests, the state legislature amended the statute a year
later so it would apply to nonpossessory interests as well. 33 When
appellate courts read section 846 to apply to government lands, the
supreme court rejected the interpretation to keep the statute consistent with
the California Tort Claims Act.'- Finally, after lower courts read into
'the statute an exception to section 846, holding that property not suitable
for recreational purposes was not eligible for statutory immunity, the
supreme court eliminated the exception in order to conform the holding to
the plain language of the statute.
35
Following the decision in Rowland v. Christian, section 846 was
challenged on the grounds that Rowland had effectively nullified the
statute.136 In English v. Marin Municipal Water District,137 the Court
of Appeal for the First District of California rejected such a challenge,
reasoning that Rowland only addressed whether the traditional common
law classifications of persons on the premises were exceptions to Civil
131. This section is limited to an analysis of the judicial challenges to Civil Code § 846, the types of
property subject to the statute, and the suitability exception. For a more complete discussion of how courts have
interpreted each element of § 846, see Weiner, supra note 111.
132. See infra notes 141-153 and accompanying text (discussing the cases leading to the 1980
amendment); infra notes 154-158 and accompanying text (developing the history of § 846's application to
governmental lands); infra notes 159-175 and accompanying text (discussing the suitability exception).
133. See infra notes 141-153 (discussing cases that led to the 1980 amendment of § 846).
134. See infra notes 154-158 and accompanying text (discussing the applicability of § 846 to government
lands); see also 1963 Cal. Stat. ch. 1681, sec. 1, at 3266 (enacting the California Tort Claims Act, CAL. GOV'T
CODE §§ 810-840.6).
135. See infra notes 159-175 and accompanying text (discussing the suitability exception to § 846); infra
notes 176-287 and accompanying text (discussing Ornelas v. Randolph).
136. English v. Manin Mun. Water Dist., 66 Cal. App. 3d 725, 728, 136 Cal. Rptr. 224, 226 (1st Dist.
1977), overruled on other grounds by Delta Farms Reclamation Dist. v. Superior Court, 33 Cal. 3d 699, 660
P.2d 1168, 190 Cal. Rptr. 494 (1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 915 (1983); see Rowland v. Christian, 69 Cal. 2d
108, 112-13,443 P.2d 561,564,70 Cal. Rptr. 97, 100 (1968) (rejecting the common law method for determining
standards of care toward persons on an owner's property and setting forth a public policy balancing test to
determine whether an exception to the general duty of care is warranted); supra notes 74-88 and accompanying
text (discussing Rowland v. Christian).
137. 66 Cal. App. 3d 725, 136 Cal. Rptr. 224 (1st Dist. 1977), overruled by Delta Farms Reclamation Dist.
v. Superior Court, 33 Cal. 3d 699, 660 P.2d 1168, 190 Cal. Rptr. 494 (1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 915 (1983).
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Code section 1714.131 The English court, therefore, held that Rowland
did not affect section 846, which is a statutory exception to the general
duty of care.139  Section 846 has also withstood equal protection
challenges."
a. Types of Property Subject to Civil Code Section 846
One issue, which has been a constant source of differing interpretations
since the enactment of Civil Code section 846, involves the type of
property that is eligible for immunity. Not only have there been disputes
as to whether public property was subject to the statute, but there have also
138. English, 66 Cal. App. 3d at 730, 136 Cal. Rptr. at 227-28; see CAL. CIV. CODE § 1714 (West Supp.
1994) (providing that all persons are responsible for injuries caused by the negligent management of their
property); supra note 28 (setting forth pertinent sections of § 1714). The English case involved a motorcyclist
who was injured when he fell down a twenty-five foot hole excavated for a water tank while riding on the Water
District's property. English, 66 Cal. App. 3d at 727, 136 Cal. Rptr. at 225-26.
139. English, 66 Cal. App. 3d at 730, 136 Cal. Rptr. at 228. The court in English reviewed the Rowland
decision and found that the Rowland court recognized two exceptions to Civil Code § 1714's general duty of
care: legislative enactments and common law rules clearly supported by public policy. Rowland, 69 Cal. 2d at
112, 443 P.2d at 564, 70 Cal. Rptr. at 100; English, 66 Cal. App. 3d at 729, 136 Cal. Rptr. at 227. The English
court found evidence of the supreme court's intention not to do away with statutory exceptions to § 1714 in
Mark v. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., 7 Cal. 3d 170,496 P.2d 1276, 101 Cal. Rptr. 908 (1972), where a nonsuit was
granted in favor of the City of San Francisco under Government Code § 818.6, which exempts public entities
from liability for injuries resulting from their failure to inspect lands not owned by them. English, 66 Cal. App.
3d at 730-31, 136 Cal. Rptr. at 228; Mark, 7 Cal. 3d at 173, 496 P.2d at 1278, 101 Cal. Rptr. at 910; see CAL.
GOV'T CODE § 818.6 (West 1980) (exempting public entities from liability for injuries caused by the failure to
inspect property). The English court also noted that the many amendments made to § 846 after Rowland
indicated that the legislature intended for § 846 to be an exception to the general duty created in section 1714.
English, 66 Cal. App. 3d at 731, 136 Cal. Rptr. at 228. See generally Weiner, supra note 111, at 203-04
(discussing how § 846 affects common law negligence and premises liability).
140. Lostritto v. Southern Pac. Transp. Co., 73 Cal. App. 3d 737,747, 140 Cal. Rptr. 905,910 (Ist Dist.
1977); see U.S. CONST. amend XIV, § 1 (prohibiting states from denying persons within theirjurisdictions equal
protection of laws); CA. CoNsT. art I, § 7(a) (providing that a person may not be denied equal protection of the
laws); see also Simpson v. United States, 652 F.2d 831, 833-34 (9th Cir. 1981) (holding that § 846 does not
violate the Equal Protection clause of the U.S. Constitution); Parish v. Lloyd, 82 Cal. App. 3d 785, 787, 147
Cal. Rptr. 431, 432 (4th Dist. 1978) (rejecting an equal protection challenge under the U.S. and California
Constitutions). In Lostritto, a 16-year-old boy, who broke his neck when he dove into a river off a trestle owned
by the defendant, argued that the provision unconstitutionally deprived persons engaging in the activities listed
in the statute from a duty of due care by landowners, while persons engaging in unlisted activities still enjoyed
such protection. Lostritto, 73 Cal. App. 3d at 747, 140 Cal. Rptr. at 910. The Lostritto court rejected this
argument, reasoning that if section 846 were held unconstitutional for failing to list a few activities, the court
would be destroying the intended trade-off of benefits. d at 748, 140 Cal. Rptr. at 911. The plaintiff also argued
that the statute was overinclusive because it applied to properties which were not intended to be used for
recreational purposes. Id. at 747, 140 Cal. Rptr. at 910. The court dismissed this contention as well, stating that
the legislature might have decided that it is unfair to allow negligence claims by persons who enter another's
property for their own recreational purposes. Id. at 748, 140 Cal. Rptr. at 911. The case did not specify whether
the plaintiff challenged § 846 under the California or United States Constitution, or both. Id. See generally
Brambach, supra note 11, at 375-77 (arguing that, despite the Lostritto decision, § 846 is still unconstitutional);
Weiner, supra note 111, at 205-08 (discussing the constitutional challenges to § 846).
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been differing views as to what kinds of private property are protected by
section 846.141 In 1979, two appellate court decisions interpreted the term
"owner of an estate" to apply only to interests in real property that are or
may become possessory, thereby disqualifying owners of nonpossessory
interests from immunity under section 846.142
In Darr v. Lone Star Industries, Inc.,43 the Court of Appeal for the
Third District of California held that an easement is not an estate in real
property.' 44 The Darr court reasoned that an easement is an interest
which does not vest exclusive possession in its holder.' 45 Stating that an
interest in land does not automatically constitute an estate in land, since
the term "estate" only refers to property interests that may become
possessory, the court concluded that the defendant was not entitled to
immunity under section 846."4
141. See infra notes 141-153 and accompanying text (discussing the applicability of § 846 to
nonpossessory interests in real property); infra notes 154-158 and accompanying text (discussing the applicability
of § 846 to governmental lands); infra notes 159-175 and accompanying text (discussing the suitability exception
to § 846).
142. See O'Shea v. Claude C. Wood Co., 97 Cal. App. 3d 903,911,159 Cal. Rptr. 125,129-30 (3d Dist.
1979), superseded by statute 1980 Cal. Stat. ch. 408, sec. 1, at 797 (amending CAL. CiV. CODE § 846) (holding
that a license is not a possessory interest and thus not eligible for immunity from liability under § 846); Darr
v. Lone Star Indus., Inc., 94 Cal. App. 3d 895, 901, 157 Cal. Rptr. 90, 94 (3d Dist. 1979), superseded by statute
1980 Cal. Stat. ch. 408, sec. 1, at 797 (amending CAL. CIV. CODE § 846) (holding that an easement is not a
possessory interest and thus not eligible for immunity from liability under § 846); see also supra note 128
(defining possessory interest in land, real property, estate, and owner). But see Smith v. Scrap Disposal Corp.,
96 Cal. App. 3d 523, 529, 158 Cal. Rptr. 134, 137 (4th Dist. 1979) (holding that because the defendant had the
duty to maintain control over the easement and the right to bar ingress, the purpose of § 846 was fulfilled, and
the defendant was entitled to immunity). See generally Review of Selected 1980 California Legislation, supra
note 128, at 599-600 (describing and giving reasons for the 1980 amendment). Section 846, at that time, did not
explicitly specify whether a possessory interest was required to trigger statutory immunity. 1979 Cal. Stat. ch.
150, sec. 1, at 347 (amending CAL CIV. CODE § 846). The 1979 version of the statute, in pertinent part, read
as follows:
An owner of any estate in real property owes no duty of care to keep the premises safe for entry or
use by others for any recreational purpose or to give any warning of hazardous conditions, uses of,
structures, or activities on such premises to persons entering for such purpose, except as provided in
this section.
Id.
143. 94 Cal. App. 3d 895, 157 Cal. Rptr. 90 (3d Dist. 1979), superseded by statute 1980 Cal. Stat. ch. 408,
sec. 1, at 797 (amending CAL. CIV. CODE § 846).
144. Id. at 901, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 94. In Darr, the defendant's predecessor obtained a right-of-way from
the State to cross a river, and constructed a bridge at that site to haul gravel. Id. at 889, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 92.
When the plaintiff sued to recover for injuries he suffered when he dove off the defendant's bridge into the river,
the defendant sought immunity under section 846. Id.
145. Id. at 900, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 93.
146. Id. at 900-01, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 93-94. The Darr court found additional support for its conclusion in
the fact that easements were not listed among the types of estates in real property enumerated in the California
Civil Code, all of which were possessory interests. Id at 901, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 94. At the time Darr was
decided, California Civil Code § 761 provided that estates in real property were either. (1) Estates of inheritance
or perpetual estates; (2) life estates; (3) estates for years; or (4) estates at will. CAL. CIV. CODE § 761 (West
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Later that year, the Court of Appeal for the Third District of California
similarly held that a license to enter another's land did not constitute a
possessory interest, and therefore was not sufficient to trigger statutory
immunity.' 47 In O'Shea v. Claude C. Wood Co., 48 the court reasoned
that a holder of a license merely has a privilege to occupy the land, and
does not have a right of possession against third persons. 149 Accordingly,
the O'Shea court construed section 846 to provide immunity only to those
with exclusive occupation of property as against the injured user.5 '
The Darr and O'Shea decisions led the legislature to immediately
amend the statute in 1980 to include owners of nonpossessory interests in
the immunity scheme.15 ' The 1980 amendment provided immunity to
owners of any estate or any other interest in real property, both possessory
and nonpossessory.'- 2 Thus, the legislature apparently intended section
846 to cover an exceptionally broad range of property interests. 53
1982). The dissent in Darr argued that § 846 applied to "any estate," and that the majority's construction
undermined the purpose of the statute. lId at 902-03, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 94-95 (Evans, AJ., dissenting). The
dissent commented on the inequitable and anomalous result of the court's decision, specifically, that the owner
of the waterway who granted the easement was protected from liability by § 846, while the owner of the
easement who built the bridge to facilitate his right-of-way remained open to liability. Id.
147. O'Shea v. Claude C. Wood, Co., 97 Cal. App. 3d 903,911, 159 Cal. Rptr. 125, 129 (3d Dist. 1979),
superseded by statute 1980 Cal. Stat. ch. 408, sec. 1, at 797 (amending CAL. CtV. CODE § 846).
148. 97 Cal. App. 3d 903, 159 Cal. Rptr. 125 (3d Dist. 1979), superseded by statute 1980 Cal. Stat. ch.
408, sec. 1, at 797 (amending CAL. CIv. CODE § 846).
149. O'Shea, 97 Cal. App. 3d at 911, 159 Cal. Rptr. at 128-29. The defendant had permission from the
landowner to store dirt on the land. Id. at 907, 159 Cal. Rptr. at 127. After the plaintiff injured himself riding
his motorcycle over a dirt pile, he sued the defendant for his injuries. Id. Finding that § 846 applied to the facts
of the case, the trial court granted summary judgment for the defendant. Id.
150. O'Shea, 97 Cal. App. 3d at 911, 159 Cal. Rptr. at 129. The court's interpretation was based on the
common law rationale that the extent of a possessor's liability was determined by the superiority of the
possessor's rights in the property over that of the injured person. Id. The O'Shea court remanded the case for
a determination of whether the defendant had a right to exclude the plaintiff. Il at 913, 159 Cal. Rptr. at 130.
151. 1980 Cal. Stat. ch. 408, sec. 1, at 797 (amending CAL CIV. CODE § 846); see Hubbard v. Brown,
50 Cal. 3d 189, 195, 785 P.2d 1183, 1185-86, 266 Cal. Rptr. 491, 493-94 (1990) (stating that the Darr and
O'Shea cases were the impetus for the 1980 amendment to California Civil Code § 846); Review of Selected
1980 California Legislation, supra note 128, at 600 (stating that the 1980 amendment was an apparent response
to the Darr and O'Shea decisions). See also Weiner, supra note 111, at 213-15 (discussing Darr, O'Shea, and
other cases giving rise to the 1980 amendment).
152. 1980 Cal. Stat. ch. 408, sec. 1, at 797 (amending CAL Civ. CODE § 846). See generally Review of
Selected 1980 California Legislation, supra note 128, at 599-600 (describing and giving reasons for the 1980
amendment).
153. Ornelas v. Randolph, 4 Cal. 4th 1095, 1102-03, 847 P.2d 560, 564-65, 17 Cal. Rptr. 2d 594, 598-99
(1993). More recently, under the expanded ownership requirement, the phrase "owner of an estate" was
construed to include holders of United States Forest Service grazing permits. Hubbard, 50 Cal. 3d at 193-94,
785 P.2d at 1185, 266 Cal. Rptr. at 493 (1990). In Hubbard, the California Supreme Court reasoned that
applying § 846 to holders of grazing permits was consistent with its purpose. Id at 195-96, 785 P.2d at 1186,
266 Cal. Rptr. at 494. The Hubbard court commented that the phrase "interest in real property" in § 846 must
not be construed so narrowly as to frustrate the legislative purpose behind the 1980 amendment. Id at 196, 785
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The range of property interests, however, does not include lands
belonging to the State of California.'5 At one time, lower courts
interpreted section 846 to allow public entities to take advantage of the
immunity scheme, but the California Supreme Court rejected this
interpretation in Delta Farms Reclamation District v. Superior Court.5 '
The supreme court found that both Civil Code section 846 and the
California Tort Claims Act 56 were enacted in the same year, and
reasoned that interpretations of each provision must be consistent with one
another. 157 The Delta court concluded that to completely immunize the
state from tort liability on its lands would lead to absurd results and
effectively nullify many important parts of the Tort Claims Act. 58
b. The Suitability Exception
The most recent change in the judicial interpretation of Civil Code
section 846 concerned the type of property to which the statute applies.
P.2d at 1186-87, 266 Cal. Rptr. at 494-95.
154. Delta Farms Reclamation Dist. v. Superior Court, 33 Cal. 3d 699, 660 P.2d 1168, 190 Cal. Rplr. 494
(1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 915 (1983). Civil Code § 846 does, however, cover federal lands. Proud v. United
States, 723 F.2d 705, 707 (9th Cir. 1984); Simpson v. United States, 652 F.2d 831, 833 (9th Cir. 1981); see
Weiner, supra note 111, at 212-13 (discussing the applicability of § 846 to federal lands); see also Butler, supra
note 111, at 60 (stating that federal courts in at least twenty states have applied recreational use statutes to
federal property).
155. 33 Cal. 3d 699, 660 P.2d 1168, 190 Cal. Rptr. 494 (1983); see Moore v. City of Torrance, 101 Cal.
App. 3d 66, 69, 166 Cal. Rptr. 192, 195-96 (2d Dist. 1979), overruled by Delta Farms Reclamation Dist. v.
Superior Court, 33 Cal. 3d 699, 660 P.2d 1168, 190 Cal. Rptr. 494 (1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 915 (1983)
(holding that public entities are eligible for immunity from liability under § 846); see also Gerkin v. Santa Clara
Valley Water Dist., 95 Cal. App. 3d 1022, 1024, 157 Cal. Rptr. 612, 614 (1st Dist. 1979), overruled by Delta
Farms Reclamation Dist. v. Superior Court, 33 Cal. 3d 699, 660 P.2d 1168, 190 Cal. Rptr. 494 (1983), cert.
denied, 464 U.S. 915 (1983) (holding that public entities are eligible for immunity from liability under § 846)
(applying § 846 to a public entity); English v. Marin Mun. Water Dist., 66 Cal. App. 3d 725,726, 136 Cal. Rptr
224, 226 (1st Dist. 1977), overruled by Delta Farms Reclamation Dist. v. Superior Court, 33 Cal. 3d 699, 660
P.2d 1168, 190 Cal. Rptr. 494 (1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 915 (1983) (applying § 846 to a public entity). But
see Nelsen v. City of Gridley, 113 Cal. App. 3d 87, 91-92, 169 Cal. Rptr. 757,759-60 (3d Dist. 1980) (holding
that § 846 does not apply to government lands).
156. See 1963 Cal. Stat. ch. 1681, sec. 1, at 3266 (enacting the California Tort Claims Act, CAL. GOV'T
CODE §§ 810-840.6).
157. Delta Farms Reclamation Dist., 33 Cal. 3d at 705, 660 P.2d at 1173-74, 190 Cal. Rptr. at 499-500.
158. Id. at 706, 660 P.2d at 1173, 190 Cal. Rptr. at 499. For example, under the Tort Claims Act, a city
would be liable for a cyclist's injuries caused by a poorly maintained street, but would be immune from such
liability if section 846 applied to public entities. Id.; see CAL. GOV'T CODE § 835 (West 1980) (providing that
public entities are liable for injuries caused by dangerous conditions on their properties); see also id. § 830(a)
(West 1980) (defining dangerous condition as a condition on property that creates a substantial risk of injury
when the property or adjacent property is used with due care in a reasonably foreseeable manner); id. § 830(c)
(West 1980) (defining public property as real or personal property owned or controlled by the public entity, not
including easements or encroachments). But see Butler, supra note 111, at 57 (stating that most states apply their
recreational statutes to both private and public property).
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For ten years after 1982, courts of appeal had interpreted section 846 as
having a suitability exception, excluding from immunity property
unsuitable for recreational purposes. 5 9  The suitability exception to
section 846, however, was not drafted by the state legislature, but was
solely a product of judicial construction. 6° Notably, many of the cases
invoking this exception have involved children, and all of them involved
construction sites.)6' Because this exception had only been held to apply
to construction sites, it is also known as the "construction site
exception."' 62
The first case to construe the suitability exception was Paige v. North
Oaks Partners.6 In Paige, the plaintiff was an eleven-year-old child
who was riding his bicycle with other children on a construction site when
he fell into a ditch and injured himself.1" The Court of Appeal for the
Second District of California held that because the construction site was
159. See Wineinger v. Bear Brand Ranch, 204 Cal. App. 3d 1003, 1010,251 Cal. Rptr. 681, 685 (4th Dist.
1988), review denied (1988) (holding that property under development is sufficiently withdrawn from
recreational use so as not to qualify for immunity); Domingue v. Presley of S. Cal., 197 Cal. App. 3d 1060,
1070,243 Cal. Rptr. 312,318 (2d Dist. 1988) (ruling that partially developed land is not suitable for recreational
purposes); Potts v. Halsted Fin. Corp., 142 Cal. App. 3d 727, 731, 191 Cal. Rptr. 160, 163 (2d Dist. 1983)
(concluding that the roof of a building under construction is not suitable for recreation); Paige v. North Oaks
Partners, 134 Cal. App. 3d 860, 865, 184 Cal. Rptr. 867, 870 (2d Dist. 1982) (holding that a construction site
is not within the scope of § 846). But see Myers v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry., 224 Cal. App. 3d 752,
758, 274 Cal. Rptr. 122, 126 (4th Dist. 1990), review denied (1991) (holding that the shoulder of a railroad right-
of-way is not per se excluded from the application of § 846); Valladares v. Stone, 218 Cal. App. 3d 362,369-70,
267 Cal. Rptr. 57, 61 (3d Dist. 1990) (ruling unimproved, vacant land adjacent to a residential housing
development to be within the scope of § 846); Nazar v. Rodeffer, 184 Cal. App. 3d 546, 554-55, 229 Cal. Rptr.
209, 213 (2d Dist. 1986) (holding that the occurrence of prior accidents on unimproved, vacant land does not
render the property unsuitable for recreational purposes); Colvin v. Southern Cal. Edison Co., 194 Cal. App. 3d
1306, 1314, 240 Cal. Rptr. 142, 147 (2d Dist. 1987) (concluding that space under transmissions lines and around
poles is suitable for recreational use and qualifies for immunity); cf Lostritto v. Southern Pac. Transp. Co., 73
Cal. App. 3d 737, 750, 140 Cal. Rptr. 905, 912 (1st Dist. 1977) (applying immunity under § 846 to a railroad
trestle overlooking a river without considering whether the property was suitable for recreational purposes). See
generally Weiner, supra note 111, at 217-21 (discussing the suitability exception).
160. Omelas v. Randolph, 4 Cal. 4th 1095, 1105, 847 P.2d 560, 566, 17 Cal. Rptr. 2d 594, 600 (1993);
see Butler, supra note 11, at 70-71 (demonstrating that many states limit the application of their recreational
use statutes to rural or undeveloped lands). See generally id. at 65-76 (analyzing the different ways in which
states limit the application of their recreational use statute).
161. See Wineinger, 204 Cal. App. 3d at 1005, 251 Cal. Rptr. at 682 (involving a 17-year-old boy riding
a land cruiser on a property under development); Domingue, 197 Cal. App. 3d at 1062, 243 Cal. Rptr. at 313
(involving a minor riding a bicycle on partially developed land); Paige, 134 Cal. App. 3d at 861, 184 Cal. Rptr.
at 867 (involving children playing tag on their bicycles on a construction site); see also Potns, 142 Cal. App.
3d at 731, 191 Cal. Rptr. at 163 (concluding that the roof of a building under construction is not suitable for
recreation); cf supra note 159 (citing cases in which the suitability exception did not apply).
162. Petition for Review of Decision of the Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District, at 3, Ornelas v.
Randolph, 4 Cal. 4th 1095, 847 P.2d 560, 17 Cal. Rptr. 2d 594 (1993) (No. F015592).
163. 134 Cal. App. 3d 861, 184 Cal. Rptr. 867 (1982).
164. Id. at 862, 184 Cal. Rptr. at 868.
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not suitable for recreational purposes, the legislature could not have
intended to extend immunity to such property. 65 The Paige court
reasoned that when section 846 was enacted in 1963, Rowland v.
Christian"6 had not yet been decided, and only the common law rules
of premises liability were available.' 67 Although landowners generally
were not liable to trespassers, the attractive nuisance doctrine was an
exception to that rule which did not preclude liability for injuries sustained
by trespassing children. 168 From the historical context of the statute, the
Paige court concluded that the legislature could not have intended to allow
children to play on temporary construction projects.
169
Many courts of appeal accepted the Paige court's reasoning and began
to apply a suitability exception to section 846.170 The primary rationale
for these courts' acceptance of the exception was the legislative purpose
behind the statute. Because the statute was intended to encourage
landowners to open their property for recreational purposes, the intent of
the statute would not be served by extending immunity to the owner of
property that was not suitable for such purposes. 17' Despite the courts'
use of judicial activism to create an exception to section 846, over the
years, the legislature took no action to amend the statute with regard to
this issue.
172
In granting review of Ornelas v. Randolph,173 the California Supreme
Court resolved to address the validity of the judicially construed suitability
exception.1 74 The court ultimately eliminated the exception in a 4-3
165. dL. at 863, 184 Cal. Rptr. at 869.
166. 29 Cal. 2d 108, 443 P.2d 561, 70 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1968).
167. Paige, 134 Cal. App. 3d at 863, 184 Cal. Rptr. at 869.
168. IU; see supra notes 59-66 and accompanying text (discussing the common law attractive nuisance
doctrine).
169. Paige, 134 Cal. App. 3d at 863, 184 Cal. Rptr. at 869.
170. See supra note 159 (citing cases that considered the suitability exception).
171. Ornelas, 4 Cal. 4th at 1103-04, 847 P.2d at 565, 17 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 599; Myers, 224 Cal. App. 3d
at 758, 274 Cal. Rptr. at 125; Wineinger, 204 Cal. App. 3d at 1008-09, 251 Cal. Rptr. 683-84; Colvin, 194 Cal.
App. 3d at 1313, 240 Cal. Rptr. at 146-47; Ports, 142 Cal. App. 3d at 730, 191 Cal. Rptr. at 162; Paige, 134
Cal. App. 3d at 863, 184 Cal. Rptr. at 869.
172. Ornelas, 4 Cal. 4th at 1111, 847 P.2d at 570, 17 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 604 (Panelli, J., dissenting). Most
states do not limit their recreational use statutes to any one type of property. Butler, supra note 111, at 65. Some
states apply their statutes only to rural lands and not to urban lands, while others limit their statutes to
undeveloped property. Id. at 70; see id. at 71 (advocating a limitation on the types of property eligible for
immunity under recreational use statutes).
173. 4 Cal. 4th 1095, 847 P.2d 560, 17 Cal. Rptr. 2d 594 (1993).
174. Id. at 1103-08, 847 P.2d at 565-69, 17 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 599-603.
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decision, leaving to the legislature the option of amending section 846 to
include a suitability exception."
II. THE CASE
A. The Factual and Procedural History
Clinton Randolph owned a large plot of land in Kern County,
California.1 16 He maintained a rental house on one part of the property
and grew crops on another part.'77 On a third part of the land, Randolph
stored old farm equipment and irrigation pipes.
178
Randolph's property abutted the backyards of several houses in an
adjacent residential subdivision.179 The section of land where Randolph
stored the old farm equipment was open, and he had not attempted to
prevent others from entering the property. 80 On January 2, 1989, eight-
year-old Jose Ornelas and five other children from the adjacent subdivision
were playing on the part of the property where the farm equipment was
stored.' While the other children were playing on top of the machinery,
Ornelas sat on the ground playing with a hand-held toy when a pipe
suddenly struck him on the head, causing serious injuries. 2
175. Id. at 1109, 847 P.2d at 569, 17 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 603.
176. Id at 1098, 847 P.2d at 561, 17 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 595.
177. L
178. Id The irrigation pipes were heavy and had a large diameter. Appeal From Superior Court of Kern
County, Appellant's Opening Brief at 1, Ornelas v. Randolph, 12 Cal. App. 4th 1017, 8 Cal. Rptr. 2d 214 (No.
F015592), rev'd, 4 Cal. 4th 1095, 847 P.2d 560, 17 Cal. Rptr. 2d 594 (1993) [hereinafter Appellant's Opening
Brief] (copy on file with the Pacific Law Journal). Randolph had stored farm equipment on the third part of the
property for nearly 30 years. Respondent's Opening Brief at 2, Ornelas v. Randolph, 4 Cal. 4th 1095, 847 P.2d
560, 17 Cal. Rptr. 2d 594 (No. S027366) (1993) [hereinafter Respondent's Opening Brief] (copy on file with
the Pacifc Law Journal).
179. Ornelas, 4 Cal. 4th at 1098, 847 P.2d at 561, 17 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 595; Appellant's Opening Brief,
supra note 178, at 1; Respondent's Opening Brief, supra note 178, at 2.
180. Respondent's Opening Brief, supra note 178, at 2.
181. Ornelas, 4 Cal. 4th at 1098, 847 P.2d at 561, 17 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 595. It is not clear whether Ornelas
entered the property for the purpose of playing on the farm equipment or whether he simply followed the other
children to observe. Id. at 1098 n.1, 847 P.2d at 562 n.l, 17 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 596 n.1. At trial, however, Ornelas
testified that he did not climb on the equipment with the other children because he was tired from playing. Id
at 1098, 1102, 847 P.2d at 561,564, 17 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 595, 598. The record indicated that Ornelas had played
on the equipment before, and that his mother had told him several times not to play on Randolph's property.
Id at 1098, 847 P.2d at 562, 17 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 596.
182. Id at 1098, 847 P.2d at 561-62, 17 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 595-96. Omelas was rendered unconscious and
suffered a basal skull fracture. Appellant's Opening Brief, supra note 178, at 1.
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Through his mother, Ornelas filed a complaint for personal injury
against Randolph in the Superior Court of Kern County. 8 3 Following
discovery, Randolph moved for summary judgment under California Civil
Code section 846, and the superior court granted Randolph's motion."
Ornelas appealed, contending that the superior court had abused its
discretion in granting summary judgment because there was a triable issue
of fact as to whether Ornelas entered the property with a recreational
purpose.185 The Court of Appeal for the Fifth District of California
reversed the superior court's decision, holding instead that section 846 did
not apply to this situation since Randolph's property was not suitable for
recreational use.8 6 Randolph then appealed to the California Supreme
Court, arguing that the court of appeal improperly expanded the suitability
exception, which had previously been held to only apply to construction
sites, by applying it to an open field storage area.' 87 The supreme court
granted review.
88
B. The Majority Opinion
The California Supreme Court, in an opinion written by Justice
Arabian, narrowly reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeal by a 4-3
vote.' 89 In reaching its decision, the supreme court initially examined the
statutory elements of section 846."9 The majority then considered what
activities constituted a "recreational purpose" under the statute and
analyzed the types of property that the California Legislature meant to
cover under section 846.29' Finally, the Ornelas court examined lower
court interpretations of the statute which did not extend immunity to lands
183. Ornelas, 4 Cal. 4th at 1098, 847 P.2d at 562, 17 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 596; Appellant's Opening Brief,
supra note 178, at 1.
184. Ornelas, 4 Cal. 4th at 1098-99, 847 P.2d at 562, 17 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 596; Appellant's Opening Brief,
supra note 178, at 2.
185. Appellant's Opening Brief, supra note 178, at 3.
186. Ornelas, 4 Cal. 4th at 1099, 847 P.2d at 562, 17 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 596. The court of appeal invited
the parties to submit supplemental briefs on the issue of whether Randolph's property was suitable for
recreational purposes. Appellant's Supplemental Letter Brief at 1, Omelas v. Randolph, 12 Cal. App. 4th 1017,
8 Cal. Rptr. 2d 214 (No. F015592), rev'd, 4 Cal. 4th 1095, 847 P.2d 560, 17 Cal. Rptr. 2d 594 (1993).
187. Petition for Review of Decision of the Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District, at 3, Ornelas v.
Randolph, 4 Cal. 4th 1095, 847 P.2d 560, 17 Cal. Rptr. 2d 594 (1993) (No. F015592) (copy on file with the
Pacific Law Journal); see supra notes 159-175 and accompanying text (discussing the suitability exception).
188. Ornelas, 4 Cal. 4th at 1098, 847 P.2d at 561, 17 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 595.
189. Ornelas, 4 Cal. 4th at 1095, 847 P.2d at 566, 17 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 594. The majority opinion was
joined by Chief Justice Lucas and Justice Baxter. Id. Justice George concurred. Id.
190. It at 1099-1100, 847 P.2d at 562-63, 17 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 596-97.
191. Id. at 1100-03, 847 P.2d at 563-65, 17 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 597-99.
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found unsuitable for recreational purposes and determined that the
legislature did not intend to include such an unwritten exception in the
statute.
1 92
1. Analyzing the Statutory Elements and Defining Recreational
Purpose
Justice Arabian stated that section 846 is an exception to the general
rule that a private landowner owes a duty of reasonable care to persons on
a landowner's property.'9 3 The majority began its opinion by setting forth
the basic elements of section 846.114 The supreme court determined that
the legislature intended to establish two requirements for immunity under
the statute.' 95 First, the defendant must be an owner of an estate or any
other possessory or nonpossess6ry interest' 96 in the property.' 97 if the
defendant meets this first requirement, the statute then requires that the
plaintiff's injury be the result of an entry into or use of the defendant's
property for "any recreational purpose."'
198
The majority then proceeded to analyze the statutory definition of
"recreational purpose."' 99 The supreme court noted that the statutory
definition of "recreational purpose" begins with the word "includes" and
is followed by a list of activities.2 ° Ordinarily, when interpreting a
statutory term defined by a list, courts are to give preference to an
interpretation which treats each item of the list uniformly in nature and in
scope. 201 The Ornelas court, however, determined that there is no
192. Id. at 1103-08, 847 P.2d at 565-69, 17 Cal. Rptr. 2d 599-603.
193. Id. at 1099, 847 P.2d at 562, 17 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 596.
194. Id.; see supra note 111 (setting forth the text of § 846).
195. Id. at 1100, 847 P.2d at 563, 17 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 597.
196. See supra notes 141-153 and accompanying text (discussing possessory and nonpossessory interests
for the purposes of § 846).
197. CAL. Civ. CODE § 846 (West Supp. 1994); Ornelas, 4 Cal. 4th at 1100, 847 P.2d at 563, 17 Cal.
Rptr. 2d at 597; see supra note 111 (setting forth the text of § 846).
198. CAL. Civ. CODE § 846 (West Supp. 1994); Ornelas, 4 Cal. 4th at 1100, 847 P.2d at 563, 17 Cal.
Rptr. 2d at 597; see supra note 111 (setting forth the text of § 846).
199. Ornelas, 4 Cal. 4th at 1101, 847 P.2d at 563, 17 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 597; see supra note 111 (setting
forth the text of § 846).
200. CAL. Civ. CODE § 846 (West Supp. 1994); Ornelas, 4 Cal. 4th at 1101, 847 P.2d at 563, 17 Cal.
Rptr. 2d at 597; see supra note II1 (setting forth the text of § 846).
201. Ornelas, 4 Cal. 4th at 1101, 847 P.2d at 563, 17 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 597; see Moore v. California State
Bd. of Accountancy, 2 Cal. 4th 999, 1011-12, 831 P.2d 798, 805, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d 358, 365 (1992) (stating that
courts will define a listed item narrowly if a broad definition of the item would render other listed items
unnecessary or redundant).
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unifying trait among the activities listed in section 846.2 The majority
found the list to contain a wide variety of activities, ranging from high-
risk, esoteric activities enjoyed by few people, to sedentary activities
amenable to anyone.20 The list included activities that could only be
performed in large tracts of open space, as well as activities that are
usually performed in more limited settings.0 4 Furthermore, the supreme
court noted that section 846 does not exclude activities involving artificial
structures. 25 As a result, the majority reasoned that climbing on farm
equipment is no different than climbing a tree or scaling a cliff for the
purposes of the statute.2°6 The Ornelas court, therefore, determined that
the list does not effectively limit the definition of "recreational purpose"
and concluded that the act of entering onto property to play on farm
equipment is a "recreational purpose" within the meaning of section
846.207
Omelas argued that there was a triable issue as to whether he entered
Randolph's property for the purpose of playing on the farm equipment or
was merely accompanying the other children.208 The supreme court,
however, found this issue to be immaterial.2 9 The majority stated that
although the issue raises a question of fact, its determination depends on
the totality of the circumstances. 210 Accordingly, the actor's subjective
202. Ornelas, 4 Cal. 4th 1101, 847 P.2d at 563-64, 17 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 597-98.
203. Id. at 1101, 847 P.2d at 563, 17 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 597. Justice Arabian cited spelunking, sport
parachuting, and hang gliding as examples of what the majority considered to be risky activities enjoyed by few
people, while citing rock collecting, sightseeing, and picnicking as examples of what the majority considered
to be sedentary pursuits. Id; see CAL Civ. CODE § 846 (West Supp. 1994) (enumerating activities included in
the statutory definition of recreational purpose); supra note Ill (setting forth the text of § 846).
204. Ornelas. 4 Cal. 4th at 1101, 847 P.2d at 563-64, 17 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 597-98. The majority used
hunting as one example of an activity listed in § 846 requiring large, open space and cited recreational gardening
and viewing historical, archaeological, scenic, natural and scientific sites as examples of activities to be
performed in a limited setting. Id.; see CAL CV. CODE § 846 (West Supp. 1994) (enumerating activities
included in the statutory definition of recreational purpose); supra note 111 (setting forth the text of § 846).
205. Ornelas, 4 Cal. 4th at 1101, 847 P.2d at 564, 17 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 598; see id. (quoting Delta Farms
Reclamation Dist. v. Superior Court, 33 Cal. 3d 699, 706-07, 660 P.2d 1168, 190 Cal. Rptr. 494, 499, 1173
(1983), cert. denied, 464U.S. 915 (1983)) (stating that "[§ 846] specifically mentions 'structures' - it obviously
encompasses improved streets.").
206. Ornelas, 4 Cal. 4th at 1101, 847 P.2d at 564, 17 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 598; see Valladares v. Stone, 218
Cal. App. 3d 362, 369, 267 Cal. Rptr. 57, 61 (3d Dist. 1990) (holding that tree climbing is a recreational
purpose).
207. Ornelas, 4 Cal. 4th at 1101, 847 P.2d at 564, 17 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 598.
208. Id, at 1102, 847 P.2d at 564, 17 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 598.
209. Id
210. I (citing Gerkin v. Santa Clara Valley Water Dist., 95 Cal. App. 3d 1022, 1027, 157 Cal. Rptr. 612,
616 (1st Dist. 1979), overruled by Delta Farms Reclamation Dist. v. Superior Court, 33 Cal. 3d 699, 660 P.2d
1168, 190 Cal. Rptr. 494 (1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 915 (1983)).
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intent, while relevant, is not the controlling factor.211 The Ornelas court
reasoned that the plaintiff's presence on the property was occasioned by
a recreational purpose regardless of whether he was an active participant
or merely a passive spectator.212 Because section 846 does not
distinguish between participants and spectators, the supreme court upheld
the trial court's finding that Ornelas went onto Randolph's property for a
213recreational purpose.
2. Examining the Types of Property Subject to Civil Code Section
846 and Rejecting the Suitability Exception
Justice Arabian continued his analysis by examining the types of
property subject to section 846.1 Under the original version of the
statute, owners of "any estate in real property" were immune from tort
liability.215 Following two appellate court decisions construing an estate
in real property to mean only a possessory interest, however, the
legislature amended section 846 to extend immunity to owners "of any
estate or any other interest in real property, whether possessory or
nonpossessory. 216 After examining the express language of the current
statute, the majority concluded that the legislature contemplated an
exceptionally broad definition of the types of property interests that will
trigger immunity under section 846.217
211. Ornelas, 4 Cal. 4th at 1101, 847 P.2d at 564,17 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 598; see also Butler, supra note II,
at 80 (explaining that courts usually consider objective indications of the entrant's purpose, rather than the
person's subjective intent).
212. Ornelas, 4 Cal. 4th at 1102,847 P.2d at564,17 Cal. Rptr. 2d at598; see also Butler, supra note 111,
at 79 (stating that spectators of recreational users frequently fall under recreational use statutes).
213. Ornelas, 4 Cal. 4th at 1102, 847 P.2d at 564, 17 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 598.
214. Id
215. 1963 Cal. Stat. ch. 1759, sec. 1, at 3511 (enacting CAL. Civ. CODE § 846).
216. 1980 Cal. Stat. ch. 408, sec. 1, at 797 (amending CAL. Civ. CODE § 846); Ornelas, 4 Cal. 4th at
1103, 847 P.2d at 565, 17 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 599; see O'Shea v. Claude C. Wood, Co., 97 Cal. App. 3d 903, 911,
159 Cal. Rptr. 125, 129 (3d Dist. 1979), superseded by statute 1980 Cal. Stat. ch. 408, sec. 1, at 797 (amending
CAL. CIV. CODE § 846) (holding that a license is not a possessory interest and does not trigger immunity under
§ 846); Darr v. Lone Star Indus., Inc., 94 Cal. App. 3d 895, 901, 157 Cal. Rptr. 90, 94 (3d Dist. 1979),
superseded by statute 1980 Cal. Stat. cb. 408, sec. 1, at 797 (amending CAL. CIV. CODE § 846) (holding that
an easement is not a possessory interest and is not entitled to immunity under § 846); supra notes 141-153 and
accompanying text (discussing the Darr and O'Shea cases and the 1980 amendment to § 846). See generally
Review of Selected 1980 California Legislation, supra note 128, at 599 (discussing the background of the 1980
amendment to § 846).
217. Ornelas, 4 Cal. 4th at 1103, 847 P.2d at 565, 17 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 599 (quoting Hubbard v. Brown,
50 Cal. 3d 189, 192, 785 P.2d 1183, 1183, 266 Cal. Rptr. 491, 491 (1990)); see Hubbard, 50 Cal. 3d at 195,
785 P.2d at 1186, 266 Cal. Rptr. at 494 (stating that the holder of a federal grazing permit is an owner of an
interest in real property and entitled to immunity under § 846).
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The majority then analyzed the appropriateness of the suitability
exception.2'8 Justice Arabian commented that section 846 on its face
does not include a suitability requirement. 219 The majority noted that
when drafting the statute, the legislature did not distinguish between urban
and rural lands, nor did it require that the property be in a natural or
unaltered state.220 The Ornelas court found that section 846 does not
provide for any type of exception from statutory immunity, even if a
particular piece of property is otherwise "unsuitable" for recreational
use.221 As a result, the supreme court concluded that the suitability
exception is a product of pure judicial construction.2 2
While noting that a court may disregard the plain language of a statute
when the language leads to absurd results or contravenes legislative
intent,223 the supreme court concluded that section 846 presented neither
problem.2 2 ' The court stated that since the statute serves a rational
purpose and is unambiguously drafted, there was no need to use extrinsic
sources to aid in its interpretation.2" The majority rejected the
conclusion reached by several lower courts that the legislature could not
have rationally intended to immunize owners of lands unsuitable for
recreation.26 Justice Arabian stated that the legislature might very well
have intended that a landowner should not be held liable for injuries
sustained by a trespasser who chooses to come onto the property for
recreational purposes.227 The supreme court reasoned that section 846 is
probably designed to allow the users of the land themselves to determine
218. Ornelas, 4 Cal. 4th at 1103, 847 P.2d at 565, 17 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 599.




223. Id (citing California Mfrs. Ass'n v. Public Utils. Comm'n, 24 Cal. 3d 836, 844, 598 P.2d 836, 840-
41, 157 Cal. Rptr. 676, 680-81 (1979)).
224. Onelas, 4 Cal. 4th at 1105, 847 P.2d at 566-67, 17 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 600-01.
225. Id. at 1105 n.8, 847 P.2d at 567 n.8, 17 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 601 n.8.
226. Id. at 1105, 847 P.2d at 566, 17 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 600; see Domingue v. Presley of S. Cal., 197 Cal.
App. 3d 1060, 1067,243 Cal. Rptr. 312, 316 (2d Dist. 1988) (stating that the legislature obviously did not intend
to encourage the public to recreate on all private property, without regard to its nature and state of development);
Potts v. Halsted Fin. Corp., 142 Cal. App. 3d 727, 730, 191 Cal. Rptr. 160, 162 (2d Dist. 1983) (commenting
that it is highly improbable that the legislature intended to encourage landowners to allow the public to recreate
on their rafters or the roofs of their new homes); Paige v. North Oaks Partners, 134 Cal. App. 3d 860, 863, 184
Cal. Rptr. 867, 869 (2d Dist. 1982) (stating that the legislature could not have intended for § 846 to apply to
temporary construction sites).
227. Ornelas, 4 Cal. 4th at 1105, 847 P.2d at 566-67, 17 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 600-01.
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whether the property is "suitable" for recreation.22 The majority
characterized the aim of the statute as a balance of public policy
considerations and, ultimately, a trade-off.2 The supreme court thus
concluded that section 846 is intended to cover all lands which people
chose to use for recreational purposes, and is not limited to any particular
type of property.,'
Justice Arabian also found that past application of the suitability
exception often led to inconsistent and unpredictable results. 231 For
example, in some cases, lower courts held that empty lots adjacent to
residential areas were suitable for recreation,232 while others interpreted
section 846 to apply primarily to large tracts of rural land.233 The
supreme court found it particularly anomalous that the Court of Appeal for
the Fourth District of California even barred a landowner from immunity
after the owner had blocked access to his property with barricades.23
The lower court reasoned that since the owner had "withdrawn" his
property from recreational use, he was ineligible for immunity because of
the suitability exception.235 The Ornelas court commented that the
inconsistent application of this rule would make it difficult for landowners
to assess whether their property is subject to immunity.236 The effect of
the exception would thus be to discourage landowners from opening their
lands for recreational use; a result in direct contradiction to the
legislature's intentions.z 7 Therefore, the supreme court concluded that
228. L at 1106, 847 P.2d at 567, 17 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 601 (quoting Stout v. United States, 696 F. Supp.
538, 539 (D. Haw. 1987)); see Stout, 696 F. Supp. at 539 (holding that a similar Hawaii statute did not
distinguish between the types of property to which it applied); see also HAW. REV. STAT. § 520-3 (1985)
(providing that owners of land have no duty of care to keep the premises safe for entry and use by others for
recreational purposes or to warn people of dangerous conditions, uses, structures, or activities on their property);
id §§ 520-1 to -8 (1985) (setting forth Hawaii's entire recreational use statute).
229. Ornelas, 4 Cal. 4th at 1106, 847 P.2d at 567, 17 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 601.
230. Id The court based its conclusion on an interpretation of Hawaii's recreational use statute. L; see
HAw. R v. STAT. § 520-1 to -8 (1985) (setting forth Hawaii's recreational use statute); Stout, 696 F. Supp. at
539.
231. Ornelas, 4 Cal. 4th at 1106, 847 P.2d at 567, 17 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 601.
232. Id; Valladares v. Stone, 218 Cal. App. 3d 362, 369-70, 267 Cal. Rptr. 57, 61 (3d Dist. 1990).
233. Ornelas, 4 Cal. 4th at 1106, 847 P.2d at 567, 17 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 601; Paige v. North Oaks Partners,
134 Cal. App. 3d 860, 865, 184 Cal. Rptr. 867, 870 (2d Dist. 1982).
234. Ornelas, 4 Cal. 4th at 1107, 847 P.2d at 568, 17 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 602; Wineinger v. Bear Brand
Ranch, 204 Cal. App. 3d 1003, 1010, 251 Cal. Rptr. 681, 685 (4th Dist. 1988), review denied (1988).
235. Ornelas, 4 Cal. 4th at 1107, 847 P.2d at 568,17 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 6O2; Wineinger, 204 Cal. App. 3d
at 1010, 251 Cal. Rptr. at 685.
236. Ornelas, 4 Cal. 4th at 1107, 847 P.2d at 568, 17 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 602.
237. Id-
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the suitability exception has the potential of hurting landowners who take
the most effort to safeguard their property.28
The majority dismissed the dissent's argument that the legislature
acquiesced to this judicial construction by not amending section 846 to
abrogate the suitability exception.2 9 Although Justice Arabian agreed
that legislative silence following judicial interpretation gives rise to an
inference of approval, he reasoned that such silence cannot be viewed as
implied legislation.2' 4 The majority further stated that when interpreting
statutes, more consideration should be given to what the legislature has
done rather than to what it has not done.24'
The Ornelas majority also rejected a hypothetical situation furthered
by the dissent.242 The dissent argued that under the majority opinion, the
owner of a construction site would be immune from liability for injuries
suffered by children playing on the property, but would still be exposed to
personal injury suits by a thief who got hurt while trying to steal a piece
of lumber.243 The majority rejected this argument by stating that the
anomaly posed by the dissent could well occur on property deemed
suitable for recreation. 2' The majority further asserted that the
legislature had already provided for similar situations under California
238. Id
239. Ormelas, 4 Cal. 4th at 1107-08, 847 P.2d at 568, 17 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 602; see infra notes 262-66 and
accompanying text (explaining the dissent's argument on legislative acquiescence).
240. Omrnelas, 4 Cal. 4th at 1108, 847 P.2d at 568, 17 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 602 (citing Harris v. Capital Growth
Investors XIV, 52 Cal. 3d 1142, 1156, 805 P.2d 873, 879, 278 Cal. Rptr. 614, 620 (1991)); see Cianci v.
Superior Court, 40 Cal. 3d 903, 923, 710 P.2d 375, 386, 221 Cal. Rptr. 575, 586 (1985) (quoting People v.
Daniels, 71 Cal. 2d 1119, 1127-28,459 P.2d 225,229,80 Cal. Rptr. 897,901-02 (1969)) (stating that legislative
silence after a court has interpreted a statute merely gives rise to a weak inference of legislative approval of the
statute's judicial construction, and that more is needed before such acquiescence can be considered implied
legislation). But see People v. Bouzas, 53 Cal. 3d 467, 475, 807 P.2d 1076, 1081, 279 Cal. Rptr. 847, 852
(1991); Fontana Unified Sch. Dist. v. Burman, 45 Cal. 3d 208, 219,753 P.2d 689, 697, 246 Cal. Rptr. 733, 741
(1988) (stating that a legislature is presumed to have been aware of and acquiesced in a court's interpretation
of a statute if the legislature reenacts the statute subsequent to the court's interpretation).
241. Omrnelas, 4 Cal. 4th at 1108, 847 P.2d at 568, 17 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 602 (citing Harris v. Capital Growth
Investors XIV, 52 Cal. 3d 1142, 1156, 805 P.2d 873, 879, 278 Cal. Rptr. 614, 620 (1991)).
242. Ornelas, 4 Cal. 4th at 1108, 847 P.2d at 568, 17 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 602.
243. Jd at 1113, 847 P.2d at 572, 17 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 606 (Panelli, J., dissenting); see Potts v. Halsted Fin.
Corp., 142 Cal. App. 3d 727,731, 191 Cal. Rptr. 161, 163 (2d Dist. 1983) (presenting the hypothetical situation
posed by the dissent); infra notes 272-276 and accompanying text (explaining the dissent's hypothetical
situation); see also supra note 1 and accompanying text (posing a similar hypothetical situation).
244. Ornelas, 4 Cal. 4th at 1108, 847 P.2d at 568, 17 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 602.
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Civil Code section 847, which immunizes landowners from injuries
sustained by felons.245
The California Supreme Court concluded in a 4-3 decision that the
legislature did not intend for California Civil Code section 846 to require
an owner's property to be suitable for recreational purposes in order to
qualify for immunity under the statute.246 The majority stated that, absent
express language to the contrary, the supreme court must assume that the
legislature correctly balanced the interests of landowners and recreational
users in drafting the statute.247 Thus, the Ornelas court held that the
Court of Appeal for the Fifth District of California erred in holding that
Randolph's property was not covered by section 846.2'
C. The Concurring Opinion of Justice George
Justice George wrote a brief concurring opinion to express his view
that section 846, as drafted, included Ornelas' conduct as a "recreational
purpose." 249 He asserted that the statute immunizes landowners from
liability for injuries sustained by users of the property for "any recreational
purpose," which includes, but is not limited to, the enumerated
activities." Justice George reasoned that the statute compelled the
court's conclusion that Ornelas' conduct was a recreational purpose, and
that courts should not attempt to rewrite the statute by adding exceptions
to it.
251
Justice George agreed with the dissent's argument that the majority's
holding will ultimately lead to the unfairness of immunizing a landowner
from liability for a trespassing child's injuries sustained while playing on
the property, while not protecting the landowner from similar suits by
245. IcL; see CAL CIV. CODE § 847 (West Supp. 1994) (providing that a landowner is not liable for
injuries sustained during the commission of specifically enumerated felonies). The majority recognized that,
under its interpretation, the legislature apparently extended broader immunity to landowners from suits by
recreational users under § 846 than from suits by felons under § 847, but stated that the supreme court may not
thwart the legislature's plainly expressed judgment absent clear evidence of a contrary intent, even if the
legislature's priorities are questionable. Ornelas, 4 Cal. 4th at 1108, 847 P.2d at 568-69, 17 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 602-
03.
246. Ornelas, 4 Cal. 4th at 1108, 847 P.2d at 569, 17 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 603.
247. Id.
248. Uat at 1109, 847 P.2d at 569, 17 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 603.
249. Id. (George, J., concurring).
250. IM. at 1110, 847 P.2d at 570, 17 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 604 (George, J., concurring).
251. 1&t
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adults on the premises for non-recreational, yet non-felonious,
purposes. 2  He reasoned, however, that such an unfair result is the
product of the statute's language, and not of the majority's opinion. 3
Justice George asserted that the same unfairness would result even if a
suitability exception was upheld by the supreme court.254 He gave as an
example a situation where landowners, owning land deemed suitable for
recreation, would be exempt from liability under the statute when children
injure themselves climbing apple trees, but would not be exempt when
adults injure themselves stealing apples.255 Justice George concluded that
the court's decision was mandated by the express language of section 846,
and only the legislature has the power to rewrite the statute. 6
D. The Dissenting Opinion
Justice Panelli wrote a dissenting opinion joined by Justices Mosk and
Kennard.257 The dissent viewed the legislature as having acquiesced to
the judicially created suitability exception because amendments to section
846 had not abrogated the lower courts' interpretations.2 8 The dissent
also found that the majority's holding, that Ornelas' conduct constituted a
recreational purpose, did not further the legislative intent of the statute. 9
Justice Panelli reasoned that the majority's holding would upset the
intended balance between tort law protection and increased recreational
opportunities. 260  Finally, the dissent disagreed with the majority's
construction of the term "any recreational purpose," reasoning instead that
the legislature's occasional additions to the list of enumerated activities
demonstrates its intent to confine the definition of recreational purpose to
the list.
261
252. L at 1109, 847 P.2d at 569, 17 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 603 (George, J., concurring); see supra notes 242-
245 and accompanying text (explaining the majority's response to the dissent's argument); infra notes 272-276
(discussing the dissent's hypothetical).
253. Ornelas, 4 Cal. 4th at 1109, 847 P.2d at 569, 17 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 603 (George, J., concurring).
254. Id at 1109-10, 847 P.2d at 569-70, 17 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 603-04 (George, J., concurring).
255. L
256. IL
257. Id at 1115, 847 P.2d at 573, 17 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 607 (Panelli, J., dissenting).
258. L at 1110-11, 847 P.2d at 570-71, 17 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 604-05 (Panelli, J., dissenting).
259. Id at 1113-14, 847 P.2d at 572, 17 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 606 (Panelli, J., dissenting).
260. L at 1112, 847 P.2d at 571, 17 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 605 (Panelli, J., dissenting).
261. L at 1113-15, 847 P.2d at 572-73, 17 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 606-07 (Panelli, J., dissenting).
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1. Interpreting Legislative Intent
Justice Panelli argued that the legislature acquiesced to the judicially
created suitability exception by not amending section 846 to abrogate the
exception.262 He noted that the suitability exception has been applied in
an unbroken line of cases since 1982.263 Under the doctrine of legislative
acquiescence, when the legislature amends a statute without changing the
portions that have been judicially construed, the legislature is presumed to
have acquiesced in that construction.2" The dissent noted that the
legislature did not address the suitability exception when amending section
846 in 1988 to include hang gliding,265 and, in contrast, took immediate
action to amend the statute after court decisions construed the ownership
requirement of the statute.26
The dissent considered the suitability exception to be consistent with
the legislative intent behind section 846.267 The statute was meant to
represent a trade-off for recreational users by exchanging their protection
under tort law for increased recreational opportunities.268 The majority
argued that this requirement would lead to the closure of property because
of the uncertainty in what is considered suitable for recreational
purposes.269 Justice Panelli, however, reasoned that such a result is
262. Id. at 1110, 847 P.2d at 570, 17 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 604 (Panelli, J., dissenting).
263. Id. at 1111, 847 P.2d at 570-71, 17 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 604-05 (Panelli, J., dissenting); see supra notes
159-175 and accompanying text (discussing the suitability exception).
264. Ornelas, 4 Cal. 4th at 1 11, 847 P.2d at 571, 17 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 605 (citing Fontana Unified Sch.
Dist. v. Burman, 45 Cal. 3d 208,219,753 P.2d 689,697,246 Cal. Rptr. 733,741 (1988)); see People v. Bouzas,
53 Cal. 3d 467,475, 807 P.2d 1076, 1081, 279 Cal. Rptr. 847, 852 (1991) (stating that a legislature is presumed
to have been aware of and acquiesced in a court's interpretation of a statute if the legislature reenacts the statute
subsequent to the court's interpretation). But see Cianci v. Superior Court, 40 Cal. 3d 903, 923, 710 P.2d 375,
386, 221 Cal. Rptr. 575, 586 (1985) (quoting People v. Daniels, 71 Cal. 2d 1119, 1127-28, 459 P.2d 225, 229,
80 Cal. Rptr. 897, 901-02 (1969)) (stating that legislative silence after a court has interpreted a statute merely
gives rise to a weak inference of legislative approval of the statute's judicial construction, and that more is
needed before such acquiescence can be considered implied legislation); supra notes 239-241 and accompanying
text (setting forth the majority's response to the dissent's argument).
265. 1988 Cal. Stat. ch. 129, sec. 1, at 507 (amending CAL. Ctv. CODE § 846). See generally Review of
Selected 1988 California Legislation, supra note 130, at 733-34 (discussing the background of the 1988
amendment to § 846).
266. Ornelas, 4 Cal. 4th at 1111, 847 P.2d at 571, 17 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 605 (Panelli, J., dissenting); see
1980 Cal. Stat. ch. 408, sec. 1, at 797 (amending CAL. CIv. CODE § 846); supra notes 141-153 and
accompanying text (explaining the cases which precipitated the 1980 amendment). See generally Review of
Selected 1980 California Legislation, supra note 128, at 599-600 (discussing the background of the 1980
amendment to § 846).
267. Ornelas, 4 Cal. 4th at 1112, 847 P.2d at 571, 17 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 605 (Panelli, J., dissenting).
268. Id.
269. Id. at 1113, 847 P.2d at 568, 17 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 602; see supra notes 231-238 and accompanying
text (explaining the majority's argument).
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consistent with the legislatively intended trade-off because non-recreational
or marginally recreational lands would be closed to the public.270 The
dissent stated that the majority's decision will instead give landowners
blanket immunity from liability and upset the balance created by the trade-
off.
2 7 1
The dissent also rejected the majority's conclusion that the legislature
might have deemed it unfair to allow negligence claims against landowners
by recreational users on the land.272 Justice Panelli argued that the
majority was speculating on that point, as there is no support for such a
contention in the legislative history.273 He added that if the legislature's
intent was to achieve fairness in tort law, it would not have used a
recreational use statute as a vehicle for achieving that goal.2 74 Justice
Panelli asserted that, under the majority's interpretation of section 846, the
purported aim of achieving fairness will miss its mark.275 For example,
a developer will be immune from liability for injuries sustained by children
playing on its construction site, but will remain liable for an adult's
injuries suffered while on the site for an illegal purpose.
276
2. Construing the Definition of Recreational Purpose
Finally, the dissent disagreed with the majority's construction of "any
recreational purpose," arguing that the phrase should be analyzed in light
of the enumerated examples of recreational purposes set forth in section
846.277 Justice Panelli stated that the majority's failure to give
significance to every word, phrase, and sentence used by the legislature
rendered the statutory list of activities "superfluous."278 He argued that
270. Ornelas, 4 Cal. 4th at 1113, 847 P.2d at 572, 17 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 606 (Panelli, J., dissenting); see id.
(reasoning that very little public benefit will be lost by the closure of such lands).
271. Id at 1113, 847 P.2d at 572, 17 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 606 (Panelli, ., dissenting).
272. Id& at 1113, 847 P.2d at 572, 17 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 606 (Panelli, J., dissenting); see id. at 1105,847 P.2d
at 567, 17 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 601 (reasoning that the legislature could have reasonably determined that it would
be unfair to hold landowners liable for injuries sustained by a recreational trespasser).
273. Ornelas, 4 Cal. 4th at 1113, 847 P.2d at 572, 17 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 606 (Panelli, J., dissenting).
274. Id.
275. Id
276. Id.; see Potts v. Halsted Fin. Corp., 142 Cal. App. 3d 727, 731, 191 Cal. Rptr. 160, 163 (2d Dist.
1983) (presenting the hypothetical situation posed by the dissent); supra notes 242-245 and accompanying text
(explaining the majority's response to this hypothetical); see also supra note 1 and accompanying text
(presenting a similar hypothetical).
277. Ornelas, 4 Cal. 4th at 1114, 847 P.2d at 573, 17 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 607 (Panelli, J., dissenting); see
supra note 111 (setting forth the text of § 846).
278. Ornelas, 4 Cal. 4th at 1114, 847 P.2d at 572-73, 17 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 606-07 (Panelli, J., dissenting),
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if the legislature did not intend to define the term through the given list of
activities, it would have been unnecessary for the legislature to continually
add to that list.
279
The dissent further asserted that when interpreting a statute, general
words that follow specific words must be interpreted to apply to items of
the same general nature as the enumerated items.80 Thus, the dissent
claimed that the phrase "any recreational activity" should be interpreted to
include only those activities similar to the ones enumerated in the statute,
and not, as the majority concluded, simply to any recreational activity.28" '
Justice Panelli was not persuaded by the analogy drawn by the majority
between playing on farm equipment and climbing a tree or cliff.2 2 He
argued that climbing on trees is usually considered a common childhood
experience, whereas climbing cliffs is normally considered a serious
sport.28 3 Playing on farm equipment, according to Justice Panelli, cannot
be considered anything but dangerous "tomfoolery" that should be
discouraged.294 The dissent further asserted that the Court of Appeal for
the Third District of California in Valladares v. Stone,215 from which the
majority found its analogy, determined that the activities enumerated in
section 846 were all a form of "nature contacting. ' 28 6 Unconvinced by
the majority's analogy, the dissent concluded that climbing on farm
equipment should not be construed as a recreational purpose.28 7
III. LEGAL RAMIFICATIONS
California Civil Code section 846 exempts landowners from liability
for injuries sustained by recreational users of their land who are not on
279. Id. at 1114, 847 P.2d at 573, 17 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 607 (Panelli, J., dissenting); see supra note 123
(citing the amendments to § 846 that added to the statutory list of activities). The majority opinion did not
address why the legislature would continue to add to the statutory list of activities if it had intended for § 846
to apply to "any recreational purpose."
280. Ornelas, 4 Cal. 4th at 1114, 847 P.2d at 573, 17 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 607 (Panelli, J., dissenting) (citing
Harris v. Capital Growth Investors XIV, 52 Cal. 3d 1142, 1160, 805 P.2d 873, 882, 278 Cal. Rptr. 614, 623
(1991)).
281. Ornelas, 4 Cal. 4th at 1114, 847 P.2d at 573, 17 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 607 (Panelli, J., dissenting).
282. Id. at 1115, 847 P.2d at 573, 17 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 607 (Panelli, J., dissenting); see supra notes 199-207
and accompanying text (discussing the majority's analogy).
283. Ornelas, 4 Cal. 4th at 1115, 847 P.2d at 573, 17 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 607 (Panelli, J., dissenting).
284. Id.
285. 218 Cal. App. 3d 362, 267 Cal. Rptr. 57 (1990).
286. Ornelas, 4 Cal. 4th at 1115, 847 P.2d at 573, 17 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 607 (Panelli, J., dissenting); see
Valladares, 218 Cal. App. 3d at 369, 267 Cal. Rptr. at 61 (stating that tree climbing is a recreational purpose).
287. Ornelas, 4 Cal. 4th at 1114-1115, 847 P.2d at 573, 17 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 607 (Panelli, J., dissenting).
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that land by express invitation or with permission.288 Rather than
providing blanket immunity from liability to all trespassers, however, the
statute focuses only on one type of trespasser - the trespasser who enters
private property for a "recreational purpose."2 9 Had the Ornelas court
applied the suitability exception in this case, the defendant probably would
not have qualified for statutory immunity.290 Instead, the Ornelas court,
choosing to confine itself to the plain language of section 846, reached an
inevitable result. While rejecting judicial limitations of the statute, the
supreme court impliedly expressed a willingness to follow a legislatively
created limitation of section 846.291
The consequences of the Ornelas case are immediately apparent from
the supreme court's decision. First, children have effectively lost much of
the protection of California tort law in premises liability cases. In Ornelas,
the supreme court likened climbing on farm equipment to climbing on
trees, and concluded that such activity constitutes "recreation."
2 92
288. CAL. Civ. CODE § 846 (West Supp. 1994); see supra note I 1l (setting forth Civil Code § 846).
289. CAL_ CIV. CODE § 846 (West Supp. 1994); see id (defining recreational purpose); see also id.
(providing that the statute does not apply to persons to whom the owner expressly invited or from whom the
owner received consideration). See generally Weiner, supra note 111, at 215-17 (discussing how courts have
interpreted the recreational purpose requirement). See also generally Brambach, supra note 111, at 375-77
(arguing that § 846 denies recreational entrants equal protection of the laws because recreational users fall within
the scope of immunity, while non-recreational users fall outside of it, but nonetheless acknowledging that the
statute has been found to be constitutional).
290. See Ornelas v. Randolph, 12 Cal. App. 4th 1017, 8 Cal. Rptr. 2d 214, 218 (5th Dist. 1992), rev'd,
Ornelas v. Randolph, 4 Cal. 4th 1095, 847 P.2d 560, 17 Cal. Rptr. 2d 594 (1993) (holding that Randolph's
property was not suitable for recreational use); see also Wineinger v. Bear Brand Ranch, 204 Cal. App. 3d 1003,
1009-10, 251 Cal. Rptr. 681, 684-85 (4th Dist. 1988), review denied (1988) (reasoning that the legislature did
not intend to encourage the public to recreate on lands under development); Domingue v. Presley of S. Cal., 197
Cal. App. 3d 1060, 1067, 243 Cal. Rptr. 312, 316 (2d Dist. 1988) (asserting that the legislature did not intend
to encourage the public to recreate on all privately owned property, regardless of kind, nature, and state of
development); Potts v. Halsted Fin. Corp., 142 Cal. App. 3d 727, 730, 191 Cal. Rptr. 160, 162 (2d Dist. 1983)
(stating that it is highly improbable that the legislature intended to encourage access to rafters and the roofs of
new homes, and that it is also unlikely that landowners would permit such use even with a grant of immunity);
Paige v. North Oaks Partners, 134 Cal. App. 3d 860, 863, 184 Cal. Rptr. 867, 869 (2d Dist. 1982) (concluding
that in attempting to open more recreational lands to the public, the legislature could not have intended to
encourage building contractors to permit children to play on construction sites).
291. See Ornelas, 4 Cal. 4th at 1108, 847 P.2d at 568-69, 17 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 602-03 (stating that the
supreme court may not thwart the legislature's plainly expressed judgment absent clear evidence of a contrary
intent); id at 1109, 847 P.2d at 569, 17 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 603 (asserting that the supreme court may question the
legislature's wisdom in extending immunity to a broad class of landowners, but may not interfere with its will);
id (George, J., concurring) (concluding that the language of § 846 compelled the majority's conclusion, and that
anomalies resulting from the provision are the product of the statute itself); see also id at 1105, 847 P.2d at 566-
67, 17 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 600-01 (indicating the supreme court's reluctance to disregard the plain language of a
statute); id at 1107, 847 P.2d at 568, 17 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 602 (quoting OLIVER W. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW
127 (1881)) (commenting that the law must tend toward narrowing the field of uncertainty).
292. Id at 1101, 847 P.2d at 564, 17 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 598; see Valladares v. Stone, 218 Cal. App. 3d 362,
369, 267 Cal. Rptr. 57, 61 (3d Dist. 1990) (concluding that clambering about in trees is a recreational use).
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Because children, especially young children, have a tendency to amuse
themselves by playing on or with anything in their immediate
surroundings, the supreme court's construction of "recreational purpose"
could potentially lead to a conclusion that all childhood activity is
"recreational. 293 Indeed, the Court of Appeal for the Second District of
California, when establishing the suitability exception, recognized that the
activities of trespassing children are usually recreational.294 Thus, the
supreme court's decision could potentially preclude a child from
recovering for injuries sustained, while playing in a neighbor's yard, as a
result of a dangerous condition on the property.295
Under Ornelas, landowners will nearly always be able to avail
themselves of immunity under Civil Code section 846 whenever a
trespassing child is injured on their property. Whereas a landowner still
owes a duty of reasonable care to a non-recreational trespasser pursuant to
Rowland v. Christian, after Ornelas, a corresponding duty toward a
recreational trespasser is nonexistent.2" The breadth of the Ornelas
decision, therefore, labels all trespassing children as recreational trespassers
and effectively denies them of any chance of recovery.297 Under the
statute, landowners thus have blanket immunity for ordinary negligence,
and section 846 acts as a complete bar to personal injury suits by children
in premises liability cases.
293. See Paige v. North Oaks Partners, 134 Cal. App. 3d 860, 864, 184 Cal. Rptr. 867, 869 (1982)
(commenting that the activities of trespassing children are usually recreational); see also Ornelas, 4 Cal. 4th at
1101, 847 P.2d at 563-64, 17 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 597-98 (stating that the examples of recreational purposes in §
846 do not share any unifying trait which would serve to restrict the definition of the term, nor are there any
other express limitations of its meaning, and therefore concluding that climbing on farm equipment is no
different than scaling a cliff or climbing a tree); id. at 1113-15, 847 P.2d at 572-73, 17 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 606-07
(Panelli, J., dissenting) (arguing that the majority reached its result by reading the phrase "any recreational
purpose" without regard to the statutory list of activities and concluding that climbing on farm equipment does
not resemble any of the listed activities); see also Valladares, 218 Cal. App. 3d at 369, 267 Cal. Rptr. at 61
(citing WEBSTER'S THmD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1899 (1986)) (defining recreational purpose as an
activity intended to refresh the body or mind by diversion, amusement or play). See generally Weiner, supra
note 11 (discussing the judicial treatment of the recreational purpose element of § 846).
294. Paige, 134 Cal. App. 3d at 864, 184 Cal. Rptr. at 869.
295. Such a situation assumes that the child was not invited onto the property by the landowner and that
the child's injuries were not caused by a dangerous condition which was willfully maintained by the owner. See
CAL. Civ. CODE § 846 (West Supp. 1994) (providing that the landowner is still liable for a person's injuries if
the person on the premises was expressly invited rather than merely permitted to enter the premises, or if the
landowner willfully failed to warn the person of a dangerous condition on the property).
296. See supra notes 74-108 and accompanying text (discussing Rowland v. Christian and a landowner's
duty of care under the Rowland decision).
297. In analyzing Wisconsin's recreational use statute, a federal district court concluded that to allow
landowners to maintain attractive nuisances and simultaneously claim immunity under Wyoming's recreational
use statute would automatically convert property into recreational land whenever a child wanders onto the
premises. Holland v. Weyher/Livsey Constructors, Inc., 651 F. Supp. 409, 412 (D. Wyo. 1987).
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Civil Code section 846 expressly provides an exception from immunity
for the willful or malicious failure to guard or warn against a dangerous
condition, use, structure or activity.298 While this arguably provides
children with some protection, the standard is nonetheless a very high one
for child plaintiffs to meet.299 Because of society's vital interest in
protecting children, landowners should not be conferred blanket immunity
for ordinary negligence."
A second consequence of the Ornelas case is that the decision
discourages landowners from protecting children against dangerous
conditions on their property - in effect, encouraging landowners to be
negligent!30 1 Prior to Rowland, the common law would have
characterized many dangerous conditions as attractive nuisances. 3' Even
after the Rowland decision and pursuant to Civil Code section 1714,
landowners have a duty to protect trespassers from the hazards of such
conditions, unless the duty is clearly contrary to public policy. 30 3 Civil
Code section 846, however, effectively provides landowners with complete
statutory immunity from such a duty in the case of recreational trespassing
children, thus permitting ordinary negligence.
Prior to the Ornelas decision, owners of land that was not suitable for
recreational purposes could not avail themselves of section 846 because of
the suitability exception.3 5 Accordingly, trespassing children could still
recover for injuries sustained on property such as construction sites. °1
By eliminating the suitability exception and construing section 846
298. CAL CIV. CODE § 846 (West Supp. 1994).
299. See Weiner, supra note IH, at 224-33 (discussing how courts have interpreted the exception for
willful or malicious failure to warn); supra note 28 (defining willful misconduct).
300. Prosser, supra note 59, at 429 (stating that society has a traditional interest in the safety and welfare
of children); see also Morse v. Douglas, 107 Cal. App. 196, 200, 290 P. 465,466-67 (4th Dist. 1930) (stating
that children are a special class warranting a higher standard of care).
301. See Ornelas v. Randolph, 12 Cal. App. 4th, 1017, 1024, 8 Cal. Rptr. 2d 214, 219 (5th Dist. 1992),
rev'd, Omelas v. Randolph, 4 Cal. 4th 1095, 847 P.2d 560, 17 Cal. Rptr. 2d 594 (1993) (reasoning that granting
immunity to owners of lands unsuitable for recreation would encourage negligent maintenance of dangerous
conditions); see also Butler, supra note 111, at 109 (concluding that a strict application of Utah's recreational
use statute will encourage landowners to be careless).
302. See supra notes 59-66 and accompanying text (discussing the common law attractive nuisance
doctrine).
303. CAL. Civ. CODE § 1714 (West Supp. 1994); Rowland v. Christian, 69 Cal. 2d 108, 112-13,443 P.2d
561, 564, 70 Cal. Rptr. 97, 100 (1968); see supra note 28 (setting forth pertinent parts of § 1714); supra note
84 and accompanying text (listing policy considerations set forth in Rowland); supra notes 74-108 and
accompanying text (discussing the Rowland decision and its effect on California premises liability law).
304. CAL. Civ. CODE § 846 (West Supp. 1994); see supra note Ill (setting forth the text of § 846),
305. See supra notes 159-175 and accompanying text (discussing the suitability exception).
306. See supra note 161 (citing cases in which the suitability exception applied to children and
construction sites).
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broadly, however, the Ornelas court left the statute without any limitation,
thus rendering any duty to trespassing children practically nonexistent. 7
Although the risk of liability would normally have given landowners an
incentive to close off their dangerous land and equipment, section 846
effectively immunizes landowners from all personal injury suits which may
be brought by trespassing children.
Because a child's activities can be easily characterized as recreational,
the Ornelas decision really only impacts children.0 8 Adults are not
affected by the decision because section 846 distinguishes between
recreational and non-recreational entrants, and landowners still owe non-
recreating adult trespassers a duty of care under Rowland.30 9 By contrast,
Ornelas virtually erases any distinction between recreating and non-
recreating children. As a result, landowners will be completely immune
from liability under section 846 without ever undertaking a Rowland
balancing test.
A. Possible Methods of Narrowing Civil Code Section 846
The most practical method of curbing the negative effects of the
Ornelas decision is the method implicitly suggested by the California
Supreme Court - amend Civil Code section 846.310 The goal of the
amendment should be to remove the blanket immunity from liability to
trespassing children currently enjoyed by landowners, while preserving the
trade-off of benefits created by the statute. This can be done in a number
of ways, three of which are explained below. This Note advocates the third
solution, excepting children from the scope of section 846, as the most
workable way to maintain the statute's intended trade-off and ensure that
trespassing children have the opportunity to recover for their injuries.
307. See Paige v. North Oaks Partners, 134 Cal. App. 3d 860, 864, 184 Cal. Rptr. 867, 869 (1982)
(stating that the activities of trespassing children are usually recreational).
308. See id. (stating that the activities of trespassing children are usually recreational).
309. See supra notes 92-95 and accompanying text (discussing landowners' duty toward trespassers after
the Rowland decision).
310. See Ornelas, 4 Cal. 4th at 1108, 847 P.2d at 568-69, 17 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 602-03 (stating that the
supreme court may not thwart the legislature's plainly expressed judgment absent clear evidence of a contrary
intent); id. at 1109, 847 P.2d at 569, 17 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 603 (asserting that the supreme court may question the
legislature's wisdom in extending immunity to a broad class of landowners, but may not interfere with its will);
id. (George, J., concurring) (concluding that the language of § 846 compelled the majority's conclusion and that
anomalies resulting from the provision are the product of the statute itself); see also id. at 1105, 847 P.2d at 566-
67, 17 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 600-01 (indicating the supreme court's reluctance to disregard the plain language of a
statute); id, at 1107, 847 P.2d at 568, 17 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 602 (quoting OUVER W. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW
127 (1881)) (commenting that the law must tend toward narrowing the field of uncertainty).
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1. Redefine "Recreational Purpose"
One way to curb the breadth of Civil Code section 846 would be to
draft a more narrow definition of "recreational purpose." '' Recreational
entrants would then have a more specific indication of what types of
activities the legislature is trying to encourage on private lands and of what
endeavors entrants will be assuming the risk.312 Using the Ornelas case
as an example, if the definition of recreational purpose were drafted so that
it did not include playing on farm equipment, Randolph would not have
been able to avail himself of section 846's grant of immunity, and would
consequently owe Ornelas a duty of reasonable care. 3 Thus, instead of
receiving an automatic grant of summary judgment, Randolph would have
had to show that the Rowland policy factors balanced in his favor, and
Ornelas would have an opportunity to show otherwise.
3 14
Ideally, the legislature could enumerate all the activities it wishes to
consider as a recreational purpose sufficient to trigger landowner immunity
and limit the statute's application to those activities.31 5 Such an
enumeration would help provide certainty in the law, and would indicate
exactly which endeavors the legislature wishes to encourage.3 16 There are
practical limitations to such an approach, however, because the legislature
will need.to continuously amend the statute in order to include activities
which were inadvertently overlooked.
311. See CAL CIV. CODE § 846 (West Supp. 1994) (defining recreational purpose to include a list of
activities); supra note 111 (setting forth the text of § 846). The concurring opinion in Ornelas regarded § 846
as applying to any recreational purpose and commented that the listed activities are stated in vague and general
terms, so that no meaningful restriction of the phrase 'recreational purpose' is possible. Ornelas, 4 Cal. 4th at
1110, 847 P.2d at 570, 17 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 604 (George, J., concurring). See Ford, supra note 111, 523-29
(comparing the statutory definition of "recreational use" in Wisconsin's recreational use statute to those of other
states, and analyzing the effectiveness of each statute).
312. See Ornelas, 4 Cal. 4th at 1115, 847 P.2d at 573, 17 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 607 (Panelli, J., dissenting)
(asserting that playing on farm equipment is "tomfoolery" that should not be encouraged).
313. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 1714 (West Supp. 1994) (providing that everyone is responsible for injuries
resulting from the negligent management of one's property); supra note 28 (setting forth the pertinent parts of
§ 1714); supra notes 74-108 (discussing Rowland v. Christian and current premises liability law in California).
314. See supra note 84 (enumerating the Rowland factors); see also supra notes 74-108 (discussing
Rowland v. Christian and current premises liability law in California).
315. This type of definition is what one researcher terms an "enumerative" definition. Ford, supra note
111, at 523-24. An enumerative definition gives a list of examples of what the entity is and is not, thereby
allowing the reader to isolate a definition of the entity by a process of recognition or elimination. Id.
316. See Ornelas, 4 Cal. 4th at 1107, 847 P.2d at 568, 17 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 602 (quoting OLIVER W.
HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 127 (1881)) (commenting that the law must tend toward narrowing the field of
uncertainty); see also id. at 1115, 847 P.2d at 572, 17 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 607 (Panelli, J., dissenting) (disapproving
of the majority's comparison of climbing farm equipment to climbing trees, commenting that playing on farm
equipment is "dangerous tomfoolery" and should not be encouraged).
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Alternatively, the legislature could adopt a definition similar to the one
propounded by the court in Valladares v. Stone: "A recreational purpose
is one intended to refresh the body or mind by diversion, amusement or
play. ' 317 Such a definition would be flexible enough to include new and
different activities over time, but would eventually lead to litigation in
order to clarify the boundaries of the definition.318
The difficulties in defining statutory terms often make it impossible to
draft a perfect definition. Therefore, rather than redefining a recreational
purpose, the legislature could instead work to improve the existing
definition. The current definition of recreational purpose appears
sufficiently workable as drafted. It allows for flexibility to include
unenumerated, but similar activities within its definition, and yet is specific
enough for courts to draw inferences as to what types of activities the
legislature contemplates within section 846.3" Given the underlying
purpose behind section 846, it may be necessary for the legislature to
allow for a broad range of recreational purposes. Thus, it appears that a re-
definition of recreational purpose might not be the best method of attaining
the goal of protecting children. Nonetheless, it remains an option.
317. Valladares v. Stone, 218 Cal. App. 3d 362, 369, 267 Cal. Rptr. 57, 61 (1990) (citing WEBSTM'S
THIn NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1899 (1986)). One researcher would characterize this definition as an
"ostensive" definition, one which describes the unique attributes of the entity being defined with sufficient clarity
to give the reader a precise and accurate understanding of what is being described. Ford, supra note 111, at 523-
24.
318. One researcher who studied the recreational use statutes of the 48 states having such provisions
concluded that enumerative definitions are the better alternative because they are usually shorter and naturally
lend to the syllogistic reasoning normally employed by legal decisionmakers. Ford, supra note 111, at 523-24.
On the other hand, ostensible definitions disrupt the reasoning process and promulgate litigation. Id. See supra
note 116 (listing the recreational use statutes of 48 states).
319. See Ford, supra note 111, at 526-27 (stating that most states use ostensible definitions which list
activities and add a catch-all clause such as "including. . ."). Many states also use phrases such as "viewing or
enjoying historical, archeological or scientific sites." IL at 527. Civil Code § 846 has such a definition. CAL.
Civ. CODE § 846 (West Supp. 1994); see supra note 111 (setting forth the text of § 846). See generally Ford,
supra note 111, at 528-34 (recommending changes to the definition of "recreational use" for Wisconsin's
recreational use statute based on his studies of other state statutes). Perhaps the legislature should make it clearer
to the courts that only activities similar to those listed should be considered when granting immunity. See
Ornelas, 4 Cal. 4th at 1101, 847 P.2d at 563-64, 17 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 597-98 (concluding that there is no unifying
trait to restrict the meaning of the phrase, and that the listed examples do not effectively limit its meaning); id.
at 1110, 847 P.2d at 570, 17 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 604 (George, J., concurring) (noting that the statute grants
immunity for "any recreational purpose," which includes the listed activities, but commenting that the list
contains activities which are so diverse and described so vaguely that there is no meaningful restriction of the
term); see also id. at 1114, 847 P.2d at 572-73, 17 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 606-07 (Panelli, J., dissenting) (arguing that
the majority's interpretation of the term renders the statutory list "superfluous"). A clear statement of legislative
intent on this matter, or a statement requiring that a recreational purpose be similar to the listed activities, would
be helpful.
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2. Draft a Suitability Exception to Civil Code Section 846
An alternative means of limiting landowner's immunity would be to
codify the lower courts' suitability exception into Civil Code section 846.
Requiring property to be suitable for recreational purposes in order to
qualify for immunity appears to be consistent with the legislative intent of
the statute.32 The majority and concurring opinions in Ornelas
demonstrated, however, that the application of the exception has led to
inconsistent and unpredictable results.32' Moreover, one researcher, who
advocates a distinction between rural and urban lands, or developed and
undeveloped property, in the application of a recreational use statute,
nevertheless recognizes the difficulties in drawing lines and classifying
property.322 Although it may be possible to draft a suitability exception
which will be consistently applied, there may be more effective and more
certain methods of tailoring the statute.
3. Draft an Exception for Injuries Sustained by Children
The most practical way to eliminate the effects of the Ornelas decision
would be to create an exception to statutory immunity in favor of injured
children. This solution is not unfair to landowners because denying
immunity under section 846 does not automatically subject the landowners
to liability. A landowner's duty of care toward a trespassing child would
instead be assessed under a Rowland v. Christian analysis, which considers
all the surrounding circumstances, relieving landowners of liability in some
instances, and holding them responsible in others.323 Such an approach
320. See supra notes 159-175 and accompanying text (discussing the suitability exception); see also Paige
v. North Oaks Partners, 134 Cal. App. 3d 860, 863, 184 Cal. Rptr. 867, 869 (2d Dist. 1982) (concluding that,
in an attempt to provide greater recreational opportunities, the legislature could not have intended to encourage
landowners to allow children to play on construction sites).
321. See supra notes 231-238 and accompanying text (discussing the majority's reasons for finding that
the suitability exception led to inconsistent results); supra notes 252-256 and accompanying text (discussing
Justice George's reasons for finding that the suitability exception led to inconsistent results). The dissent only
argued that the legislature had acquiesced to the lower courts' suitability exception, not that the exception served
as a good limitation to § 846. See supra notes 267-271 and accompanying text (discussing the dissent's
arguments concerning the suitability exception).
322. Butler, supra note I 11, at 70-71. See id. (discussing how different states draw distinctions between
the types of lands to which their recreational use statutes apply and assessing the merits and difficulties of
drawing such distinctions).
323. See supra notes 74-108 and accompanying text (discussing the Rowland case and the Rowland
approach to premises liability cases); supra note 84 (listing the Rowland factors to balance in determining the
existence of a duty).
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will assure children the opportunity to recover for injuries, while giving
landowners the chance to exonerate themselves. Furthermore, because
Rowland and Civil Code section 1714 require landowners to be reasonable
in the management of their property, landowners will once again be
discouraged from being negligent.3 '4  These results are consistent with
society's traditional interest in the safety and welfare of children.3"
California could join the six states that already expressly exempt
injured children from their recreational use statutes through the application
of the attractive nuisance doctrine.326 While there are some states whose
recreational use statutes have been held to override the attractive nuisance
doctrine,327 there are other states that judicially retain the doctrine to
limit the scope of their immunity provisions.328 California should amend
the Civil Code section 846 to include an explicit exception for children in
order to prevent the anomalous results which follow from the Ornelas
decision.
The California Government Code provides for such an exception in
another area.329 Government Code section 831.8 immunizes a public
entity from liability for injuries caused by a condition of a reservoir or
324. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1714 (West Supp. 1994); see supra notes 74-88 and accompanying text (discussing
the Rowland case); supra note 28 (setting forth pertinent parts of § 1714).
325. This interest, taken with the impracticability of expecting parents to continuously supervise their
children and the maturity and judgment that children lack, justifies the difference in the treatment of trespassing
adults and children. Prosser, supra note 59, at 428-29. See Morse v. Douglas, 107 Cal. App. 196, 200, 290 P.
465, 466-67 (4th Dist. 1930) (stating that children are a special class warranting a higher standard of care).
326. COLO. REv. STAT. § 33-41-104(l)(c) (1984); IND. CODE ANN. § 14-2-6-3 (West Supp. 1993); IOWA
CODE ANN. § 461C.7 (West Supp. 1993); S.D. CODn~mD LAws ANN. § 20-9-18 (1987); TaX. CtV. PI.AC. &
RENI. CODE ANN. § 75.003(b) (West Supp. 1994); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 4.24.210(3) (West Supp. 1994).
See generally Butler, supra note 111, at 84-87 (discussing the approaches by which different states exempt
children from their provisions).
327. See Grice v. City of Dothan, 670 F. Supp. 318, 322 (M.D. Ala. 1987) (holding that children are not
to be treated differently than adults under Alabama's recreational use statute); Graham v. County of Gratiot, 337
N.W.2d 73, 75-76 (1983)-(holding that attractive nuisance claims are barred when Michigan's recreational use
statute applies); Margo v. City of Vineland, 371 A.2d 815, 818 (1977) (finding that the New Jersey legislature
did not intend to exempt infant claimants from statutory immunity); Butler, supra note 111, at 86-87 (discussing
states which do not allow for an attractive nuisance exception). At least one California court has considered this
issue. In Hale v. City of Santa Paula, 159 Cal. App. 3d 1233, 206 Cal. Rptr. 265 (2d Dist. 1984), hr'g granted,
appeal dismissed (1985), the court concluded that because Civil Code § 846 makes no reference to children, it
applies equally to all persons. Id. at _ , 206 Cal. Rptr. at 268. This opinion, however, is not citable as
authority in California state courts. See CAL. CT. R. 977(a) (prohibiting the citation of depublished opinions).
328. See Smith v. Crown-Zellerbach, Inc., 638 F.2d 883, 885 (5th Cir. 1981) (finding that the Louisiana
Legislature, in enacting its recreational use statute, did not intend to remove liability for the maintenance of
attractive nuisances); Holland v. Weyher/Livsey Constructors, Inc., 651 F. Supp. 409, 416 (D. Wyo. 1987)
(concluding that the attractive nuisance doctrine is an exception to Wyoming's recreational use statute); Butler,
supra note 11, at 85-86 (discussing the Smith and Holland cases and other states which retain an attractive
nuisance exception).
329. CAL GOVT CODE § 831.8(d) (West 1980).
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canal when the injured person was using the property for an unintended
purpose.33 ° That statute, however, expressly sets forth an exception which
does not limit liability when the injured person is under twelve years of
age. 331 Government Code section 831.8 was enacted in the same year as
Civil Code section 846, and these provisions were considered by the same
committees of the Assembly and Senate before the legislature passed them
into law.332 Although the legislature did not include such an exception
to Civil Code section 846 at that time, it should do so now.
The exception to Government Code section 831.8 resembles the
provision in the Restatement (Second) of Torts governing artificial
conditions highly dangerous to trespassing children, and serves as an
attractive nuisance exception to the statute.33 Government Code section
831.8 was enacted before Rowland v. Christian,3  which abrogated the
common law status distinctions as well as the attractive nuisance
330. Jd § 831.8(a)-(b) (West 1980).
331. Id. § 831.8(d) (West 1980). The exception provides as follows:
Nothing in this section exonerates a public entity or a public employee from liability for injury
proximately caused by a dangerous condition of property if:
(1) The person injured was less than 12 years of age;
(2) The dangerous condition created a substantial and unreasonable risk of death or serious bodily
harm to children under 12 years of age using the property or adjacent property with due care
in a manner in which it was reasonably foreseeable that it would be used;
(3) The person injured, because of his immaturity, did not discover the condition or did not
appreciate its dangerous character, and
(4) The public entity or the public employee had actual knowledge of the condition and knew or
should have known of its dangerous character a sufficient time prior to the injury to have taken
measures to protect against the condition.
332. 1963 Cal. Stat. ch. 1681, sec. 1, at 3274 (enacting CAL. GOV'T CODE § 831.8); 1963 Cal. Stat. ch,
1759, sec. 1, at 3511 (enacting CAL. CIV. CODE § 846); see Delta Farms Reclamation Dist. v. Superior Ct., 33
Cal. 3d 699,705-06,660 P.2d 1168, 1171-1172, 190 Cal. Rptr. 494,497-98 (1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 915
(1983). See generally id. at 705-07, 660 P.2d at 1171-73, 190 Cal. Rptr. at 497-99 (reasoning that because the
legislature included immunity provisions in the California Tort Claims Act, state governmental entities could
not avail themselves of Civil Code § 846).
333. See CAL GOV'T CODE § 831.8 Legislative Committee Comment-Assembly (West 1980) (stating
that the immunities provided under § 831.8 are inapplicable when the conditions of the exception are met, and
commenting that private landowners are subject to liability without regard to the age of the injured person under
the attractive nuisance doctrine); supra note 60 (setting forth Restatement (Second) of Torts § 339 (1965)).
California Government Code § 831.8(d) differs from the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 339 in that § 831.8
does not require the public entity to foresee children trespassing on its property and does not require that the
risk to children be greater than the burden of eliminating the danger and the utility of maintaining the condition.
CAL GOv'T CODE § 831.8(d) (West 1980); RESTAmMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 339 (1965); see supra notes
59-66 and accompanying text (discussing the common law attractive nuisance doctrine).
334. 69 Cal. 2d 108, 443 P.2d. 561, 70 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1968).
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doctrine.335 Thus, instead of implementing a codified attractive nuisance
exception, the legislature could simply exempt injured children .from the
application of Civil Code section 846 entirely, thereby allowing the
Rowland approach to govern the situation. 6
The Rowland approach has many advantages over the attractive
nuisance doctrine. The first application of Rowland to a trespassing child
resulted in the court declaring an end to the attractive nuisance
doctrine. 337 In Beard v. Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe Railway Co.,
338
the Court of Appeal for the Second District of California also pointed out
that under the Rowland approach, the burden of proof had shifted to the
defendant landowner to show that the trespassing child had assumed the
risks of encountering the dangerous condition on the property.339 This
result benefitted the child plaintiff in Beard because he did not need to
prove the existence of an attractive nuisance.m
The conclusion in Beard is relevant to the recreational use situation. If
the legislature were to adopt an exception comparable to that of
Government Code section 831.8, the burden would be on child plaintiffs
to prove the requisite elements." On the other hand, by applying the
Rowland approach, defendant landowners would bear the burden of
demonstrating that they should be exempt from the general duty of care by
balancing the public policy factors?2 Therefore, the Rowland approach
would be more helpful to trespassing children.
335. See supra notes 74-108 and accompanying text (discussing the Rowland decision and its effects). As
a legislative enactment, Government Code § 831.8 was not affected by the Rowland decision because Rowland
only eliminated common law exceptions to the general duty of reasonable care. English v. Main Mun. Water
Dist., 66 Cal. App. 3d 725, 729-30, 136 Cal. Rptr. 224, 227-28 (1st Dist. 1977), overruled on other grounds by
Delta Farms Reclamation Dist. v. Superior Court, 33 Cal. 3d 699, 660 P.2d 1168, 190 Cal. Rptr. 494 (1983),
cert. denied, 464 U.S. 915 (1983); see CAL. CIV. CODE § 1714 (West Supp. 1994) (setting forth the general duty
of care); supra note 28 (setting forth parts sections of § 1714).
336. See supra notes 89-108 and accompanying text (discussing the effects of the Rowland approach).
337. Beard v. Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe Ry., 4 Cal. App. 3d 129, 135-37, 84 Cal. Rptr. 449,453-55
(2d Dist. 1970), superseded by statute on other grounds, 1971 Cal. Stats. ch. 1554, sec. 1, at 3067 (enacting
CAL. CIv. CODE § 1714.7).
338. 4 Cal. App. 3d 129, 84 Cal. Rptr. 449 (2d Dist. 1970), superseded by statute, 1971 Cal. Stats. ch.
1554, sec. I, at 3067 (enacting CAL. CIV. CODE § 1714.7).
339. lId at 129. 136-37, 84 Cal. Rptr. at 454 (1970); see supra notes 99-105 and accompanying text
(discussing the shift of the burden of proof in premises liability cases involving trespassing children after
Rowland).
340. Beard, 4 Cal. App. 3d at 129, 84 Cal. Rptr. at 454 (2d Dist. 1970).
341. See supra note 331 (setting forth the exception to Government Code § 831.8).
342. See supra notes 89-108 and accompanying text (discussing the Rowland approach to determining a
public policy exception to the general duty of care).
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One commentator has concluded that the attractive nuisance doctrine
works just as well as the Rowland general reasonableness standard. 3 He
notes, for example, that the foreseeability requirement of the doctrine is
nothing new because it is already a part of negligence law.4 Finding no
justification for distinguishing between trespassing children and trespassing
adults, he reasons that a general negligence approach would reach the same
results as an application of the doctrine.
345
The flexibility of the Rowland approach also appears to provide both
the recreational entrant and the landowner a fair chance at prevailing and
ultimately reaching a just result.3 4 Another commentator has determined
that the Rowland approach is perfectly suited to the recreational use
situation presented by Civil Code section 846.347 She reasons that a
landowner's grant of public recreational access would receive favorable
judicial consideration, a factor which will be balanced with the
foreseeability of the entrant's injury.' 8 Focusing on agricultural
landowners' interests, she concluded that this approach offers adequate
protection for landowners.
349
343. Reynolds, supra note 59, at 348; see Shara, supra note 75, at 186-87 (remarking that Rowland merely
reaffirms the basis of the attractive nuisance doctrine; that children lack the judgment and maturity to appreciate
certain types of dangers).
344. Reynolds, supra note 59, at 349.
345. Id. at 354. Another statistical study found that the majority of premises liability cases decided under
a Rowland-type approach would reach the same outcome as if they were decided under the common law status
rules. Hawkins, supra note 75, at 56-57; see id. at 61 (concluding that the protection of trespassing children
under special status rules is difficult to distinguish substantively from the duty of reasonable care); see also
Shindurling, supra note 75, at 78 (reasoning that the same results are reached in premises liability cases under
both the common law approach and the Rowland approach).
346. Brambach, supra note Ill, at 371-73.
347. Id at 373-74.
348. Id. at 371-73; see supra note 84 (setting forth the Rowland factors); supra notes 89-108 (discussing
the Rowland approach). Ms. Brambach posed the following hypothetical and analyzed it under the Rowland
approach: a swimmer is injured in a farmer's pond which the farmer uses to water livestock. Brambach, supra
note 111, at 371. She points out that the entrant has the burden to prove the farmer's foreseeability of the harm,
which is usually less in the case of a trespasser, the dangerous condition of the land, and the fanner's awareness
of the risk Id She asserts that the injury would not be foreseeable as a matter of law if the farmer provided an
adequate warning of the danger. Id. at 372. A court would also consider both the practicability of fencing off
the danger and the cost of posting a warning. Id Ms. Brambach argues that a court would take into account
whether the injury was caused by a definite act by the farmer or a mere failure to act, and would likely grant
the farmer's summary judgment motion if there is even a tenuous connection between the fanner's conduct and
the swimmer's injury. Id Finally, she maintains that a court would reward the farmer for granting public
recreational access when considering the extent of the farmer's burden, the consequences to the community, and
the moral blame attached to the farmer's conduct. Id at 372, 373 n.17.
349. Id. at 370; see also Hawkins, supra note 75, at 18-19 (asserting that where common law status rules
have been abolished, the values and policies implicit in those relationships remain important considerations that
juries will consider). Ms. Brambach ultimately concludes, however, that § 846 is entirely unnecessary because
the same results will be reached in most cases using the Rowland approach, and asserts that the Rowland
1184
1994 / The Protection of Children After Ornelas v. Randolph
It thus appears that an exception to Civil Code section 846 completely
exempting injured children from the rule of nonliability is superior to
codifying an attractive nuisance doctrine exception to the statute. This
exception is probably the best solution to eliminating the bad effects of the
Ornelas decision."' It will protect children, and at the same time, will
be fair to landowners because their liability will be predicated on a
balancing of the Rowland factors.351 Removing injured children from the
scope of section 846 will relieve child plaintiffs from the burden of
proving the elements of an attractive nuisance exception.35 2 This solution
will maintain the trade-off designed into section 846 while providing
protection for children. Landowners, regardless of their property's
suitability for recreational use, will be able to take advantage of statutory
immunity and will therefore still have an incentive to keep their property
open to public access.353 Adult recreational entrants will still have the
ability to choose the type of land on which to recreate, and landowners
will not have to worry about liability as long as they act reasonably with
regard to children.
354
approach will produce more just results. Brambach, supra note 111, at 370-71.
350. There is one situation in which this exception could conceivably lead to anomalous results: a father
and daughter are bicycling on a plot of land, and both are injured when they fall into a covered ditch. See Hale
v. City of Santa Paula, 159 Cal. App. 3d 1233, 206 Cal. Rptr. 265, 266 (2d Dist. 1984), hr'g granted, appeal
dismissed (1985) (involving a similar fact pattern, but without the parent figure). Hale is not citable as authority
in California state courts. See CAL. Cr. R. 977(a) (prohibiting the citation of depublished opinions). Applying
this Note's proposed amendment to this situation, the landowner would owe a duty of care to the daughter, but
not to the father. This anomaly might be rectified under the doctrine of comparative fault, under which the father
could be found negligent in failing to supervise his daughter, and the landowner's liability (assuming that the
Rowland factors balance in favor of finding a duty toward the daughter) would be reduced by the percentage
of negligence found on the father's part. Alternatively, the statute could tailor the exception, exempting children
unaccompanied by their parents or guardians from the immunity provision.
351. See supra notes 346-349 and accompanying text (discussing the application of the Rowland approach
to recreational use situations); supra note 84 (listing the Rowland factors).
352. See supra notes 99-105 & 337-342 and accompanying text (discussing the shift of the burden of proof
in premises liability cases involving trespassing children after Rowland)
353. See Ornelas, 4 Cal. 4th at 1106, 847 P.2d at 567, 17 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 601 (stating that the policy
behind § 846 is to encourage landowners to allow access to their property in exchange for the entrants' waivers
of their right to sue for negligence); supra notes 124-126 and accompanying text (discussing the purpose behind
§ 846).
354. See Ornelas, 4 Cal. 4th at 1106, 847 P.2d at 567, 17 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 601 (reasoning that § 846 allows
entrants to determine for themselves whether a particular property is suitable for recreational purposes). It is
possible, of course, that insurance premiums for landowners will increase as a result of this exception. In arguing
to overrule the suitability exception to Civil Code § 846, the California Farm Bureau Federation asserted that
farmers' comprehensive personal liability insurance has increased 45% over the past 10 years, and that the
statutory immunity provided by § 846 keeps the price of insurance down. Brief Amicus Curiae of California
Farm Bureau Federation in Support of Clinton Randolph, Defendant and Respondent, at 2, Ornelas v. Randolph,
4 Cal. 4th 1095, 547 P.2d 560, 17 Cal. Rptr. 2d 601 (1993) (No. S027366). A court, however, will take this
issue into account under a Rowland analysis. See supra note 84 (listing the prevalence and availability of
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Furthermore, an exception for children will bring certainty to the scope
of Civil Code section 846, and will not result in some of the anomalies
caused by the suitability exception. For example, under the suitability
exception, adults, as well as children were able to raise a claim for injuries
occurring on a construction site.3 5 Because the rationale behind the
statute is that recreational users waive their rights to sue landowners for
negligence, adult trespassers who choose to enter the property of another
should not be able to sue at all.356 On the other hand, society has an
interest in protecting children, who do not possess the same level of
maturity and intelligence as adults.357 An exception for children will also
eliminate the inconsistencies in the current statute, whether it is applied
with or without a suitability exception. The inconsistencies are apparent in
Justice Panelli's child and thief hypothetical in Ornelas and in the
hypothetical posed in the Introduction to this Note. Under an exception
for injured children, the child as well as the thief will be able to raise a
claim against the landowner. The exception, therefore, brings certainty to
insurance as one of the Rowland factors); supra notes 346-349 and accompanying text (discussing the flexibility
of the Rowland approach to recreational use situations).
355. See Potts v. Halsted Fin. Corp, 142 Cal. App. 3d 727, 732, 191 Cal. Rptr. 160, 163 (2d Dist. 1983)
(applying the suitability exception to an adult plaintiff and reversing a nonsuit in favor of an owner of two
houses under construction); see supra notes 159-175 and accompanying text (discussing the suitability
exception).
356. See Ornelas, 4 Cal. 4th at 1106, 847 P.2d at 567, 17 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 601 (explaining the purpose of
§ 846). Dean Prosser asserts that adult trespassers are wrongdoers who have no right to demand a safe place to
trespass, especially since they can protect themselves from ordinary dangers and make conscious decisions to
assume the risks that they encounter. Prosser, supra note 59, at 427-28. He also argues that it is desirable social
policy to allow landowners to use their property as they please, and that they should not have the burden to
protect those who enter their land without permission. Id. at 428. Trespassing children, however, do not have
the same level of maturity and judgment as adults, and therefore warrant a greater degree of protection under
the law. Id. at 428-29.
357. See Prosser, supra note 59, at 429 (arguing that children, because of their lack of maturity and
judgment capabilities, cannot fully appreciate the dangers they encounter, and therefore deserve greater protection
under the law); Gurwin, supra note 59, at 137 n.20 (stating that there is a need for increased protection of child
trespassers because they are not always aware of the dangerous conditions on land, and commenting that the
Rowland approach adequately protects children, but imposes a similar duty of care on landowners toward adults);
see also Morse v. Douglas, 107 Cal. App. 196, 200, 290 P. 465, 466-67 (4th Dist. 1930) (stating that children
are a special class warranting a higher standard of care).
358. See supra note 1 and accompanying text (presenting the introductory hypothetical); supra notes 272-
276 and accompanying text (discussing Justice Panelli's hypothetical). But see supra notes 251-255 and
accompanying text (discussing Justice George's assertion that the inconsistency addressed in Justice Panelli's
hypothetical apply with equal force to the statute without the suitability exception).
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the application of section 846, a result that the Ornelas court would
favor.
359
Finally, an exception in favor of children will effectively retain the
positive aspects of the suitability exception. The suitability exception
probably led to the closure of dangerous properties, such as construction
sites, as well as marginally recreational lands because owners of those
properties were still subject to liability.3 60 This is a good result because
recreation on such property would bring little public benefit.361 Similarly,
while the restoration of the duty of care to children on the part of
landowners might result in the closure of some lands to the public, the
affected properties would probably be of little recreational value to
children, or even adults.
B. A Proposed Amendment to Civil Code Section 846
A proposed amendment to California Civil Code section 846 is set
forth below to implement the changes advocated in this Note. The
proposed amendment adds an exception to section 846, exempting children
under the age of twelve from the immunity provision.' 62 All new
language to the statute is denoted in italics and any deleted language is
struck out. As the current version of section 846 has not been divided into
subsections, this amendment proposes that separate sections be enumerated.
Additionally, the proposed amendment deletes the references to common
359. See Ornelas, 4 Cal. 4th at 1107, 847 P.2d at 568, 17 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 602 (quoting OLIVER W.
HOul ES, THE COMMON LAw 127 (1881)) (commenting that the law must tend toward narrowing the field of
uncertainty); id. at 1110, 847 P.2d at 570, 17 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 604 (George, J., concurring) (concluding that the
language of § 846 compelled the majority's conclusion and that anomalies resulting from the provision are the
product of the statute itself); see also id. at 1105, 847 P.2d at 566-67, 17 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 600-01 (indicating the
supreme court's reluctance to disregard the plain language of a statute); icl at 1109, 847 P.2d at 569, 17 Cal.
Rptr. 2d at 603 (asserting that the supreme court may question the legislature's wisdom in extending immunity
to a broad class of landowners, but may not interfere with its will).
360. Ornelas, 4 Cal. App. 4th at 1113, 847 P.2d at 572, 17 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 606 (Panelli, J., dissenting).
361. Il
362. The proposed amendment limits liability at 12 years of age. This decision was based on the age set
in Government Code's attractive nuisance exception. CAL GOV'T CODE § 831.8(d)(1) (West 1980); see supra
notes 329-336 and accompanying text (discussing the attractive nuisance exception to governmental immunity
from suits for injuries sustained in resovoirs and canals). The legislature may find that landowners' liability
should be limited at a different age. See TEX. CIV. PRAc. & REM. CODE ANN. § 75.003(b) (West Supp. 1994)
(limiting children under the age of 16 from the application of the attractive nuisance exception to Texas'
recreational use statute); see also CAL GOV'T CODE § 831.8(d)(1) (West 1980) (requiring as an element to the
exception that the injured child be under 12 years of age). See generally, Prosser, supra note 59, at 439-42
(discussing the difficulties of drawing lines at certain ages). A bill to amend Civil Code § 846 was introduced
as this Note was going to print. A.B. 3818, 1993-94 Cal. Regular Sess. The introduced version of the bill
accomplishes the same objective of this Note's proposed amendment by creating an exception for minors. I&
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law status distinctions because they are no longer useful under current
California law. 63
§ 846. Permission to enter for recreational purposes.
(a) An owner of any estate or any other interest in real
property, whether possessory or nonpossessory, owes no
duty of care to keep the premises safe for entry or use by
others for any recreational purposes or to give any warning
of hazardous conditions, uses of, structures, or activities on
such premises to persons entering for such purpose, except
as provided in this section.
(b) A "recreational purpose," as used in this section, includes
such activities as fishing, hunting, camping, water sports,
hiking, spelunking, sport parachuting, riding, including
animal riding, snowmobiling, and all other types of
vehicular riding, rock collecting, sightseeing, picnicking,
nature study, nature contacting, recreational gardening,
gleaning, hang gliding, winter sports, and viewing or
enjoying historical, archaeological, scenic, natural, or
scientific sites.
(c) An owner of any estate or any other interest in real
property, whether possessory or nonpossessory, who
gives permission to another for entry or use for the
above purpose upon the premises does not thereby
(a)(1) extend any assurance that the premises are safe for such
purpose, or
(b) eonstitute the person te whem permission has been
granted the legal status of an invitee or licensee-to
whom a duty of eare is owed, or
(c)(2) assume responsibility for or incur liability for any injury
to person or property caused by any act of such person
to whom permission has been granted except as
provided in this section.
363. See Brambach, supra note 111, at 379-80 (advocating the deletion of common law distinctions from
§ 846). For an alternative approaches to amend Civil Code § 846, see id. at 379 n.38; CouNciL oF STATE
GOVERNMENTS, SuGGESTED STATE LEGISLATION, VOL. XXIV, at 150-52 (1965) (providing the model
recreational use statute). Neither Ms. Brambach's amendment nor the model recreational use statute, however,
provide an exception for children.
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(d) This section does not limit the liability which otherwise
exists
(a)(1) for willful or malicious failure to guard or warn against
a dangerous condition, use, structure or activity; or
Ob)(2) for injury suffered in any case where permission to
enter for the above purpose was granted for a
consideration other than the consideration, if any, paid
to said landowner by the state, or where consideration
has been received from others for the same purpose; or
()(3) to any persons who are expressly invited rather than
merely permitted to come upon the premises by the
landowner; or
(4) to injured persons under 12 years of age at the time of
the injury.
(e) Nothing in this section creates a duty of care or ground of
liability for injury to person or property.
IV. CONCLUSION
The legislative purpose behind Civil Code section 846 is to encourage
landowners to open their lands to recreational entrants.3' By enacting
section 846, the legislature intended the statute to effect a trade-off of
incentives for both recreational entrants and landowners. 365 The statutory
scheme encouraged landowners to keep their lands open in exchange for
immunity from liability, and provided recreational opportunities to the
public in return for a waiver of the right to sue.36 As with any plan,
however, side effects do not become apparent until after the plan is put
into effect. Such is the case with section 846.
When section 846 was first drafted, the legislature may have believed
that abundant recreational opportunities could only be made available by
providing broad, blanket immunity. The courts, with an eye toward
legislative intent, however, limited the statute's scope by creating the
suitability exception. 367 Unfortunately, the application of this exception,
while in line with the purpose of section 846, led to some anomalous
364. Ornelas, 4 Cal. 4th at 1106, 847 P.2d at 567, 17 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 601; see supra notes 124-126
(discussing the purpose behind § 846).
365. Ornelas, 4 Cal. 4th at 1106, 847 P.2d at 567, 17 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 601.
366. Id.
367. See supra notes 159-175 and accompanying text (discussing the suitability exception to § 846).
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results. 68 In Ornelas v. Randolph, the California Supreme Court rejected
the suitability exception in .a 4-3 decision, leaving the statute to provide
landowners with untempered blanket immunity against personal injury suits
by recreational entrants.
369
The potential effect of section 846 under Ornelas is to leave children
unprotected by California tort law in premises liability cases. 370 The
Ornelas decision will also remove incentives for landowners to keep
children away from dangerous conditions on their property.371 In order
to effect its purpose while minimizing the adverse consequences, the
statute's scope must be controlled. This can be done most effectively by
creating an exception to the statute's grant of immunity for injured
children.372 An amendment to Civil Code section 846 should be drafted
to exempt situations involving children injured on private property from
the immunity scheme.373 Such an amendment will produce fair and just
results in recreational use cases because a landowner's duty of care will
be assessed under the Rowland v. Christian approach, which is flexible
enough to accommodate different situations.374
The Ornelas v. Randolph decision perpetuates the unfairness apparent
in Mary's situation.375 In order to rectify the injustices toward trespassing
children in accord with society's interest in the welfare of children, the
legislature must immediately make an exception to the California
recreational use statute. The Ornelas decision, therefore, mandates an
amendment to Civil Code section 846.
Michael D. Lee
368. See supra notes 231-238 and accompanying text (discussing the Ornelas majority's reasons for
finding that the suitability exception led to inconsistent results); supra notes 251-255 and accompanying text
(discussing Justice George's reasons for finding that the suitability exception led to inconsistent results).
369. Ornelas, 4 Cal. 4th at 1109, 847 P.2d at 569, 17 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 603.
370. See supra notes 288-309 and accompanying text (discussing the effects of the Ornelas dcision).
371. A
372. See supra notes 323-361 and accompanying text (discussing an exception from § 846 for injured
children).
373. See supra notes 362-363 and accompanying text (discussing and setting forth the proposed
amendment to § 846).
374. See supra notes 346-349 (discussing the flexibility of the Rowland approach and its applicability in
recreational use situations).
375. See supra note I and accompanying text (presenting a hypothetical).
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